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Citations of
Francoise Forges

For current contact information and a more complete listing of works, please see here

The citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.

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Working papers

  1. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli, 2006. "Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets," Working Papers ubs0609, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:

    Cited by:

    1. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2008. "Rationalizable Voting," Wallis Working Papers WP51, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
    2. Chambers, Christopher P. & Echenique, Federico & Shmaya, Eran, 2007. "On behavioral complementarity and its implications," Working Papers 1270, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  2. F. Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2003. "Communication Equilibria with Partially Verifiable Types," THEMA Working Papers 2003-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Ingela Alger & Regis Renault, 2003. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 562, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 09 Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Francoise Forges & Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Long Persuasion Games," THEMA Working Papers 2006-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    4. Ingela Alger & Regis Renault, 2000. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Care about Fairness," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 489, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 09 Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Frederic Koessler, 2006. "Lobbying with Two Audiences: Public vs Private Certification," THEMA Working Papers 2006-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Joel Watson & Jesse Bull, 2006. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16R, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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  3. F. Forges, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game," THEMA Working Papers 2002-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]

  4. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
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    4. CRÉMER, Jacques & D'ASPREMONT, Claude & GÉRARD-VARET, Louis-André, 2003. "Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms," IDEI Working Papers 196, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    6. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehlé, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 678.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    7. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehle, 2004. "Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores," Game Theory and Information 0403004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  5. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2003. "On The Continuity Of Equilibrium And Core Correspondences In Economies With Differential Information," Economics Working Papers we032707, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Vincent Anesi, 2007. "Information Aggregation in Spatial Committee Games," Discussion Papers 2007-03, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
    4. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    5. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Khan, M. Ali Khan, 2007. "Perfect Competition," MPRA Paper 2202, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    7. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    9. S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007. "Private information, transferable utility,and the core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0703, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Forges, F. & Heifetz, A. & Minelli, E., 1999. "Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics," Papers 99-06, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
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    Cited by:

    1. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 2002. "Approximate Cores Of Games And Economies With Clubs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 634, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    3. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Khan, M. Ali Khan, 2007. "Perfect Competition," MPRA Paper 2202, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    5. Kovalenkov, Alexander & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Advances In The Theory Of Large Cooperative Games And Applications To Club Theory : The Side Payments Case," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 641, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    6. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  7. F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999. "A note on the incentive compatible core," THEMA Working Papers 99-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    2. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    3. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    4. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    5. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007. "Private information, transferable utility,and the core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0703, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  8. Forges, F., 1998. "Ex Post Individually Rational Trading Mechanisms," Papers 9810, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
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    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    2. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2006. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000085, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

  9. Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers 9624, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Ehud Kalai, 2005. "Partially-Specified Large Games," Discussion Papers 1403, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers 9605, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
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    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Lorenzo Rocco, 2001. "Nonatomic Games with Limited Anonymity," Working Papers 39, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
    2. Bochet,Olivier, 2005. "Switching from Complete to Incomplete Information," Research Memoranda 035, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995. "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers 9518, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Stefano, LOVO, 2007. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 884, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
    2. LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 845, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]

  12. Forges, F., 1993. "A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies," Papers 9343, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  13. Forges, F., 1993. "Five Ligitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Game with Incomplete Information," Papers 9309, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001569, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    3. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001574, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Alfredo Di Tillio, . "Subjective Expected Utility in Games," Working Papers 311, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    6. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Forges, F., 1990. "Some Thoughts on Efficiency and Information," Papers 9071, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    2. Beth Allen, 1996. "Cooperative theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 225, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]

  15. Forges, F., 1988. "Repeated Games Of Incomplete Information: Non-Zero-Sum," Papers 8805, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
    Published as:

    Cited by:

    1. Robert J. Aumann, 2006. "War and Peace," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000332, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    2. O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 2000. "Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information," THEMA Working Papers 2000-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Christian Lukas & Jens Robert Schöndube, 2008. "Trust and Adaptive Learning in Implicit Contracts," FEMM Working Papers 08017, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management. [Downloadable!]
    4. LOVO, Stefano & HÖRNER, Johanes, 2006. "Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information," Les Cahiers de Recherche 845, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
    5. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Articles

  1. Forges, Francoise & Koessler, Frederic, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 793-811, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  2. Forges, Francoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 135-151, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  3. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  4. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  5. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 179-188, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  6. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  7. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  8. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 388-406, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  9. Forges, Francoise & Peck, James, 1995. "Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-50, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Hens, Thorsten & Mayer, Janós & Pilgrim, Beate, 2004. "Existence of Sunspot Equilibria and Uniqueness of Spot Market Equilibria: The Case of Intrinsically Complete Markets," Discussion Papers 2004/15, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
    2. Thorsten Hens & Beate Pilgrim, . "Subsidizing Charitable Giving in a Field Experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp070, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    3. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Proof of the Existence of Speculative Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1003, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    4. Julio Dávila, . "Reducing Overlapping Generations Economies to Finite Economies," CARESS Working Papres 00-08, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Sayantan Ghosal & Massimo Morelli, 2002. "Retrading in Market Games," Economics Working Papers 0012, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    7. Martin Shubik, 1986. "A Game Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Money and Financial Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 805, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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    8. Thorsten Hens & Beate Pilgrim & Janos Mayer, . "Existence of Sunspot Equilibria and Uniqueness of Spot Market Equilibria: The Case of Intrinsically Complete Markets," IEW - Working Papers iewwp188, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    9. Hens, Thorsten & Pilgrim, Beate, 2004. "Sunspot Equilibria and the Transfer Paradox," Discussion Papers 2004/14, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]

  10. Forges Francoise, 1994. "Posterior Efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 238-261, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    2. Rohit Rahi, 2000. "Efficiency Properties of Rational Expectations Equilibria with Asymmetric Information," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1468, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Forges, Francoise, 1994. "A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-31, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.

  12. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Debora Di Gioacchino, 2005. "Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination And Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis," Macroeconomics 0504024, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    2. Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Discussion Papers 892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    4. Murali Agastya & Flavio Menezes & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000551, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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    5. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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    7. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    8. Jerome Mathis, 2006. "Full Revelation of Information in Sender-Receiver Games of Persuasion," THEMA Working Papers 2006-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    9. Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, . "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Papers 023, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
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    10. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  13. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Correlated Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 515, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Michael Chwe, 2006. "Statistical Game Theory," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000004, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    2. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . ""The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*''," CARESS Working Papres 95-18, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "The Geometry of Nash Equilibria and Correlated Equilibria and a Generalization of Zero-Sum Games," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 641, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Noa Nitzan, 2005. "Tight Correlated Equilibrium," Discussion Paper Series dp394, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]

  14. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Chirantan Ganguly and Indrajit Ray, . "Can Mediation Improve Upon Cheap-Talk? A Note," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
    2. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions," Working Papers 2007-03, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
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    3. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    4. Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
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    5. O. Gossner, 1999. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," THEMA Working Papers 99-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
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    6. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
    7. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    8. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    9. Frédéric KOESSLER, 2002. "Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games: A General Model," Working Papers of BETA 2002-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
    10. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
    11. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    12. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  15. Forges, Francoise, 1988. "Can sunspots replace a mediator?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 347-368, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, . "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    2. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    3. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    4. Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, . "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Papers 023, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

  16. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

    Cited by:

    1. Chirantan Ganguly and Indrajit Ray, . "Can Mediation Improve Upon Cheap-Talk? A Note," Discussion Papers 05-08, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. [Downloadable!]
    2. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, . "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
    3. F. Forges & B. von Stengel, 2002. "Computionally Efficient Coordination in Games Trees," THEMA Working Papers 2002-05, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
    4. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1989. "Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 693, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    5. Olivier Gossner & Abraham Neyman & Penélope Hernández, 2005. "Optimal Use Of Communication Resources," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    7. Adam Brandenburger, 2008. "The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002312, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    8. Chaim Fershtman, 1987. "Cooperation Through Delegation," Discussion Papers 731, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    9. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "A Connection Between Correlation in Game Theory and Quantum Mechanics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001725, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    10. Kohei Kawamura, 2006. "Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission," Economics Series Working Papers 268, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    11. Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2004. "Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 287, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    12. Karl Iorio & Alejandro M. Manuelli, 1990. "Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games," Discussion Papers 915, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    13. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    14. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    15. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    16. R. Joosten, 2007. "Strategic Advertisement with Externalities: A New Dynamic Approach," Papers on Econonmics and Evolution 2007-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
    17. Beth Allen, 2000. "The Future of Microeconomic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 143-150, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    18. Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," ESE Discussion Papers 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Board, Oliver J. & Blume, Andreas & Kawamura, Kohei, 2007. "Noisy talk," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 395-440, December. [Downloadable!]
    19. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    20. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000280, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    21. R. Joosten, 2005. "A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs," Papers on Econonmics and Evolution 2005-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
    22. Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    23. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    24. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1986. "Are Bayesian-Nash Incentives and Implementations Perfect?," Discussion Papers 680, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    25. Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, . "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Papers 023, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    26. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    27. Ehud Lehrer & Sylvain Sorin, 1994. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Discussion Papers 1108, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
    28. Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Documentos de Trabalho em Economia (Working Papers in Economics) 042008, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto). [Downloadable!]
    29. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 40, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:

Chapters

  1. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:

    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of chapters recorded.

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This page was last updated on 2008-10-4.

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