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Long Cheap Talk

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Author Info

  • Robert J. Aumann

    ()

  • Sergiu Hart

    ()

Abstract

With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message - even when one side is strictly better informed than the other.

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File URL: http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/long.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp284.

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Length: 59 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2002
Date of revision: Nov 2002
Publication status: Published in Econometrica, 2003, vol. 71, pp. 1619-1660.
Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284

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Related research

Keywords: cheap talk; communication; long conversation; incomplete information; game theory; signalling; joint lottery; dimartingale; di-span;

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References

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  1. Forges, Françoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/184, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Baliga, Sandeep & Morris, Stephen, 2002. "Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 450-468, August.
  4. HART, Sergiu, . "Nonzerosum two-person repeated games with incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -636, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Blume, A. & Sobel, J., 1991. "Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics 91-27, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  6. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  7. Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
  8. Matthews, Steven A. & Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1991. "Refining cheap-talk equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 247-273, December.
  9. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
  10. Joseph Farrell., 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 8609, University of California at Berkeley.
  11. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May.
  12. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  13. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
  14. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000766, David K. Levine.
  15. Rabin, Matthew & Sobel, Joel, 1996. "Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 1-25, January.
  16. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
  17. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  18. Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1980. "A Two-Person Game of Information Transmission," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 418, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. M. Rabin, 2010. "Communication Between Rational Agents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 539, David K. Levine.
  20. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jorgen W., 2000. "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap-Talk Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-24, July.
  21. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  22. Zapater, Inigo, 1997. "Credible Proposals in Communication Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 173-197, January.
  23. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
  24. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  25. Simon, Robert Samuel, 2002. "Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 79-102, October.
  26. Mertens, J.-F., 1986. "Repeated games," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1986024, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  27. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP -914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. “Long Cheap Talk,” R. Aumann & S. Hart (2003)
    by afinetheorem in A Fine Theorem on 2013-02-11 10:49:00
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