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Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria

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Author Info
Steven A. Matthews
M. Okuno-Fujiwara
Andrew Postlewaite

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Abstract

Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on he concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/892.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 892R.

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Date of creation: Jun 1990
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:892r

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Matthews, Steven A, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 347-69, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication," Working papers 386, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. McLennan, Andrew, 1985. "Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 889-904, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1989. "Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 693, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  7. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Seidmann, Daniel J., 1990. "Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 445-458, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Myerson, Roger B., 1989. "Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 264-303, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Experimental 0503005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Discussion papers 05018, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). [Downloadable!]
  3. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Sandeep Baliga & Stephen Morris, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Co-ordination with Payoff Uncertainty," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1203, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kris De Jaegher & Marc Jegers, 2001. "The physician-patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(7), pages 651-668. [Downloadable!]
  7. Péter Eső & James Schummer, 2009. "Credible deviations from signaling equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 411-430, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247. [Downloadable!]
  12. Paul Calcott, 1999. "Demand inducement as cheap talk," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(8), pages 721-733.
  13. Andreas Blume, 1995. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9504002, EconWPA, revised 29 May 1996. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ronald G. Cummings & Laura O. Taylor, 1999. "Unbiased Value Estimates for Environmental Goods: A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 649-665, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  16. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  17. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1995. "Vagueness, credibility, and government policy," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q I, pages 13-19. [Downloadable!]
  19. Peter Cramton & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1995. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Papers of Peter Cramton 95geb, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Andreas Blume, 1996. "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Game Theory and Information 9605004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  21. Sopher, B. & Zapater, I., 1993. "Communication and Coordination in Signalling Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 93-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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