Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 896.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 1997
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- McLennan, Andrew, 1985. "Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 889-904, July.
- E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998.
"On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
445, David K. Levine.
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