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Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication

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Author Info
Joseph Farrell

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 386.

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Date of creation: Jun 1985
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Handle: RePEc:mit:worpap:386

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Postal: MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA
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  1. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1992. "On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 992, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  2. Steven A. Matthews, 1988. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Model," Discussion Papers 805, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Discussion Papers 892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Steven A. Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, 1987. "Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person Sealed-Bid Double Auctions," Discussion Papers 744R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Sopher, B. & Zapater, I., 1993. "Communication and Coordination in Signalling Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 93-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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