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On Forward Induction

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  • Srihari Govindan
  • Robert Wilson

Abstract

A player's pure strategy is called relevant for an outcome of a game in extensive form with perfect recall if there exists a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome for which the strategy is an optimal reply at every information set it does not exclude. The outcome satisfies forward induction if it results from a weakly sequential equilibrium in which players' beliefs assign positive probability only to relevant strategies at each information set reached by a profile of relevant strategies. We prove that if there are two players and payoffs are generic, then an outcome satisfies forward induction if every game with the same reduced normal form after eliminating redundant pure strategies has a sequential equilibrium with an equivalent outcome. Thus in this case forward induction is implied by decision-theoretic criteria. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000788.

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Date of creation: 26 Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000788

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009. "Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000231, David K. Levine.
  2. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008. "Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002381, David K. Levine.
  3. Inderst, Roman & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2010. "Securitization and Compensation in Financial Institutions," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8089, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Heller, Yuval & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Rule Rationality," MPRA Paper 48746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Justification of Stable Equilibria," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1896, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  6. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "'On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000825, David K. Levine.
  7. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2008. "Decision-Theoretic Forward Induction," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business 1986, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  8. Oikonomou, V.K. & Jost, J, 2013. "Periodic strategies and rationalizability in perfect information 2-Player strategic form games," MPRA Paper 48117, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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