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Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Roger B. Myerson
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number
295.
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Date of creation: Aug 1977Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:295Contact details of provider: Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014 Phone: 847/491-3527 Fax: 847/491-2530 Email: Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/ More information through EDIRC
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