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Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs

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Author Info
Govindan, Srihari (U of Iowa)
Wilson, Robert B. (Stanford U)

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Abstract

Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence only on the game's normal form even when embedded in a larger game with redundant strategies or irrelevant players (small worlds). The axioms are satisfied by a set that is stable (Mertens, 1989) and conversely the axioms imply that each selected set is stable and thus an essential component of admissible equilibria with the same outcome.

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Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2000.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2000

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  1. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007. "On Forward Induction," Research Papers 1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Metastable Equilibria," Research Papers 1934r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Sufficient Conditions for Stable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000267, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Ying Chen & Navin Kartik & Joel Sobel, 2008. "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 117-136, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Essential Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001035, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1992. "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 553-564, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Srihari Govindan & Jean-François Mertens, 2004. "An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 339-357, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2001. "Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 765-69, May.
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