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Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games with Generic Payoffs

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  • Govindan, Srihari

    (U of Iowa)

  • Wilson, Robert B.

    (Stanford U)

Abstract

Three axioms from decision theory select sets of Nash equilibria of signaling games in extensive form with generic payoffs. The axioms require undominated strategies (admissibility), inclusion of a sequential equilibrium (backward induction), and dependence only on the game's normal form even when embedded in a larger game with redundant strategies or irrelevant players (small worlds). The axioms are satisfied by a set that is stable (Mertens, 1989) and conversely the axioms imply that each selected set is stable and thus an essential component of admissible equilibria with the same outcome.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 2000.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:2000

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  1. Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2006. "Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 167-206, June.
  2. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000618, David K. Levine.
  3. Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August.
  4. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007. "Metastable Equilibria," Research Papers 1934r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  6. Srihari Govindan & Jean-François Mertens, 2004. "An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 339-357, 06.
  7. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2001. "Direct Proofs of Generic Finiteness of Nash Equilibrium Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 765-69, May.
  8. Srihari Govindan & Tilman Klumpp, 2003. "Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 229-243.
  9. MERTENS, Jean-François, . "The small worlds axiom for stable equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  11. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006. "Essential Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001035, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Ying Chen & Navin Kartik & Joel Sobel, 2008. "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(1), pages 117-136, 01.
  14. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
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