# David K. Levine

# Levine's Working Paper Archive

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**Series handle:**repec:cla:levarc

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### 2016

**786969000000001375 Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons***by*Juan I Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**786969000000001365 Entertaining Malthus: Bread, Circuses and Economic Growth***by*Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Nicholas W Papageorge & Lemin Wu**786969000000001323 A Folk Theorem with Codes of Conduct***by*Juan I Block & David K Levine**786969000000001316 Size, Fungibility, and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations***by*David K Levine & Salvatore Modica**786969000000001307 Whither Game Theory?***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**786969000000001288 Collusion Constrained Equilibrium***by*Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica**786969000000001234 Voter Participation with Collusive Parties***by*David K Levine & Andrea Mattozzi

### 2015

**786969000000001019 Tipping Points and Business-as-Usual in a Global Carbon Commons***by*Rodrigo Harrison & Roger Lagunoff**786969000000001011 Collusion, Randomization, and Leadership in Groups***by*Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica**786969000000001002 A Unifying Learning Framework for Building Artificial Game-Playing Agents***by*W Chen & Y Chen & D Levine

### 2014

**786969000000000990 Intellectual Property***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**786969000000000982 Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups***by*Rohan Dutta & David K Levine & Salvatore Modica**786969000000000973 Peer Discipline and Incentives Within Groups***by*David K Levine & Salvatore Modica**786969000000000962 Altruism and Self Control***by*Anna Dreber & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & David G Rand**786969000000000954 The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time***by*Kevin Hasker**786969000000000950 On the relationship between individual and group decisions***by*Joel Sobel**786969000000000944 The Network Origins of Large Economic Downturns***by*Daron Acemoglu & Asuman E. Ozdaglar & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi**786969000000000939 Slow Moving Debt Crises***by*Guido Lorenzoni & Ivan Werning**786969000000000929 Career Concerns and Market Structure***by*Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner**786969000000000923 The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade***by*Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri**786969000000000919 Kantian Optimization: An Approach to Cooperative Behavior***by*John E. Roemer**786969000000000914 Equality of Opportunity***by*John E. Roemer & Alain Trannoy**786969000000000909 Selling Cookies***by*Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti**786969000000000904 Fairness Through the Lens of Cooperative Game Theory: An Experimental Approach***by*Geoffroy De Clippel & Kareen Rozen**786969000000000898 Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction***by*Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris**786969000000000892 Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?***by*Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000887 Promises and Expectations***by*Florian Ederer & Alexander Stremitzer**786969000000000881 Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games***by*Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille**786969000000000875 Gaming and Strategic Opacity in Incentive Provision***by*Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret A. Meyer

### 2013

**786969000000000934 Perspectives, Opinions, and Information Flows***by*Rajiv Sethi & Muhamet Yildiz**786969000000000841 Reason-Based Rationalization***by*Franz Dietrich & Christian List**786969000000000836 Back to Fundamentals: Convex Geometry and Economic Equilibrium***by*Michael Richter & Ariel Rubinstein**786969000000000831 Dynamic Mechanism Design for a Global Commons***by*Rodrigo Harrison & Roger Laguno ff**786969000000000824 One Swallow Does not Make a Summer: New Evidence on Anchoring Effects***by*Zacharias Maniadis & Fabio Tufano & John List**786969000000000819 The Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibria***by*Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan**786969000000000814 Markets, Correlation, and Regret-Matching***by*Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell**786969000000000809 Concave Expected Utility and Event Separability***by*Ehud Lehrer & Roee Tepper**786969000000000803 Political Economy in a Changing World***by*Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin**786969000000000797 Network Security and Contagion***by*Daron Acemoglu & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman E. Ozdaglar**786969000000000792 Keynesian Utilities: Bulls and Bears***by*Anat Bracha & Donald Brown**786969000000000787 Biology and the Arguments of Utility***by*Luis Rayo & Arthur J. Robson**786969000000000782 (Ir)rational Exuberance: Optimism, Ambiguity, and Risk***by*Anat Bracha & Donald Brown**786969000000000776 The Limits of Price Discrimination***by*Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin A. Brooks & Stephen Morris**786969000000000771 Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions***by*Dirk Bergemann & Achim Wambach**786969000000000765 Competing for Consumer Inattention***by*Geoffroy De Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Kareen Rozen**786969000000000760 Alfred Marshall's Cardinal Theory of Value: The Strong Law of Demand***by*Donald Brown & Caterina Calsamiglia**786969000000000755 Leverage and Default in Binomial Economies: A Complete Characterization***by*Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos**786969000000000750 Financial Innovation, Collateral and Investment***by*Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos**786969000000000746 Afriat from MaxMin***by*John Geanakoplos**786969000000000741 Collateral Equilibrium: A Basic Framework***by*John Geanakoplos & William R. Zame**786969000000000735 The Evolution of 'Theory of Mind': Theory and Experiments***by*Erik O. Kimbrough & Nikolaus Robalino & Arthur J. Robson**786969000000000730 The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000725 Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000699 Market for Degrees and Educational Standards***by*David K Levine & Salvatore Modica**786969000000000692 Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State***by*David K Levine & Salvatore Modica**786969000000000685 Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**786969000000000680 Selling Information***by*Johannes Horner & Andrzej Skrzypacz**786969000000000676 Relational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up***by*Sebastian Kranz**786969000000000671 Incentives for Experimenting Agents***by*Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson**786969000000000666 Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000660 Testing for Fictive Learning in Decision-Making Under Uncertainty***by*Oliver Bunn & Caterina Calsamiglia & Donald Brown**786969000000000654 A Political Theory of Populism***by*Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin**786969000000000649 A Testable Theory of Imperfect Perception***by*Andrew Caplin & Daniel Martin**786969000000000644 Complex Questionnaires***by*Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein**786969000000000635 Breakdowns***by*Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady

### 2012

**786969000000000625 Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations***by*Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny**786969000000000620 “Neuro”‐Observational Learning***by*Kfir Eliaz & Ariel Rubinstein**786969000000000614 Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints and a Strategic Buyer***by*James J. Anton & Gary Biglaiser & Nikolaos Vettas**786969000000000608 Terms of Endearment: An Equilibrium Model of Sex and Matching***by*Peter Arcidiacono & Andrew Beauchamp & Marjorie B. McElroy**786969000000000601 Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000596 Delay as Agenda Setting***by*James J. Anton & Dennis Yao**786969000000000591 Generalized Partition and Subjective Filtration***by*David Dillenberger & Philipp Sadowski**786969000000000583 A Theory of Subjective Learning***by*David Dillenberger & Juan Sebastian Lleras & Philipp Sadowski & Norio Takeoka**786969000000000577 Evolutionary Dynamical Pattern of 'Coyness and Philandering': Evidence from Experimental Economics***by*Bin Xu & Zhijian Wang**786969000000000572 Learning and Risk Aversion***by*Carlos Oyarzun & Rajiv Sarin**786969000000000567 Runs, Panics and Bubbles: Diamond Dybvig and Morris Shin Reconsidered***by*Eric Smith & Martin Shubik**786969000000000559 Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information***by*Dirk Bergemann & Ji Shen & Yun Xu & Edmund M. Yeh**786969000000000551 Matching with Incomplete Information***by*Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson**786969000000000545 Connected Substitutes and Invertibility of Demand***by*Steven Berry & Amit Gandhi & Philip A. Haile**786969000000000541 What is a Solution to a Matrix Game***by*Martin Shubik**786969000000000537 Notes on Computational Complexity of GE Inequalities***by*Donald Brown**786969000000000532 The Financing of a Public Utility***by*Eric Smith & Martin Shubik**786969000000000526 Competing for Customers in a Social Network (R)***by*Pradeep K. Dubey & Rahul Garg & Bernard De Meyer**786969000000000517 The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs***by*Yi-Chun Chen & Alfredo Di Tillio & Eduardo Faingold & Siyang Xiong**786969000000000512 Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models***by*Attila Ambrus & Kareen Rozen**786969000000000507 Robust Comparative Statics in Large Dynamic Economies***by*Daron Acemoglu & Martin Kaae Jensen**786969000000000502 Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model***by*Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky**786969000000000497 Multi-Dimensional Iterative Reasoning in Action: The Case of the Colonel Blotto Game***by*Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein**786969000000000492 On Fairness of Random Procedures***by*Kfir Eliaz & Ariel Rubinstein**786969000000000480 Codes of Conduct, Private Information and Repeated Games***by*Juan I Block & David K Levine**786969000000000472 An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis**786969000000000465 The Case Against Patents***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**786969000000000457 From Imitation to Collusion: Long-run Learning in a Low-Information Environment***by*Daniel Friedman & Steffen Huck & Ryan Oprea & Simon Weidenholzer**786969000000000451 Financial reporting and market e¢ ciency with extrapolative investors***by*Milo Bianchi & Philippe Jehiel**786969000000000445 Competition For A Majority***by*Paulo Barelli & Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson**786969000000000433 Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items***by*Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan**786969000000000427 Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi**786969000000000423 Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers***by*Sebastian Kranz**786969000000000418 Incentives for Experimenting Agents***by*Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson**786969000000000412 On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games***by*Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille**786969000000000407 Kantian Optimization, Social Ethos, and Pareto Efficiency***by*John E. Roemer**786969000000000402 The Allocation of a Prize***by*Pradeep K. Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi**786969000000000396 Social Preferences under Uncertainty: Equality of Opportunity vs. Equality of Outcome***by*Kota SAITO**786969000000000390 Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags***by*Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers**786969000000000384 Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey***by*Markus K. Brunnermeier & Thomas M. Eisenbach & Yuliy Sannikov**786969000000000376 Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty***by*P Battigalli & S Cerreia-Vioglio & F Maccheroni & M Marinacci**786969000000000371 Output contingent securities and efficient investment by firms***by*Luis H.B. Braido & V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha**786969000000000359 The Network Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations***by*Daron Acemoglu & Vasco M. Carvalho & Asuman E. Ozdaglar & Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi**786969000000000353 Optimism and Pessimism with Expected Utility***by*David Dillenberger & Andrew Postlewaite & Kareen Rozen**786969000000000347 A Theory of Asset Prices Based on Heterogeneous Information***by*Elias Albagli & Christian Hellwig & Aleh Tsyvinski**786969000000000342 Career Concerns with Coarse Information***by*Alessandro Bonatti & Johannes Horner**786969000000000336 Prizes Versus Wages with Envy and Pride***by*Pradeep K. Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Ori Haimanko**786969000000000331 Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris

### 2011

**786969000000000326 Implementation of Reduced Form Mechanisms: A Simple Approach and a New Characterization***by*Sergiu Hart & Philip J. Reny**786969000000000321 The Role of Information in Competitive Experimentation***by*Ufuk Akcigit & Qingmin Liu**786969000000000316 Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?***by*Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy**786969000000000309 Separating Gratitude from Guilt in the Laboratory***by*Hong Lin & David Ong**786969000000000304 Reputation with Analogical Reasoning***by*Philippe Jehiel & Larry Samuelson**786969000000000299 Social Approval, Competition, and Cooperation***by*Xiaofei Pan & Daniel Houser**786969000000000293 Cycles, Gaps, and the Social Value of Information***by*George-Marios Angeletos & Luigi Iovino & Jennifer La'O**786969000000000287 Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?***by*Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik**786969000000000281 A Political Theory of Populism***by*Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin**786969000000000275 Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000270 Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision***by*David A. Miller & Kareen Rozen**786969000000000265 Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000258 A Model of Persuasion with a Boundedly Rational Agent***by*Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein**786969000000000250 Smooth Politicians And Paternalistic Voters: A Theory Of Large Elections***by*Marco Faravelli & Randall Walsh**786969000000000243 Equilibrium and Strategic Communication in the Adverse Selection Insurance Model***by*Gerald D. Jaynes**786969000000000232 Competition and Innovation***by*Michele Boldrin & Juan C Allamand & David K Levine & Carmine Ornaghi**786969000000000227 Rational Expectations: Retrospect and Prospect***by*Kevin D. Hoover & Warren Young**786969000000000222 A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations***by*Huseyin Yildirim & Alvaro Name Correa**786969000000000213 A Dynamic Model of Demand for Houses and Neighborhoods***by*Patrick J. Bayer & Robert McMillan & Alvin Murphy & Christopher Timmins**786969000000000208 Payoff Uncertainty, Bargaining Power, and the Strategic Sequencing of Bilateral Negotiations***by*Silvana Krasteva & Huseyin Yildirim**786969000000000203 Competition, Consumer Welfare, and the Social Cost of Monopoly***by*Yoon-Ho Alex Lee & Donald Brown**786969000000000197 Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives***by*Elias Albagli & Christian Hellwig & Aleh Tsyvinski**786969000000000192 Tranching, CDS and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes***by*Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos**786969000000000187 Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**786969000000000177 Evolving to the Impatience Trap: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game***by*David K Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita**786969000000000173 The Present and Future of Game Theory***by*Martin Shubik**786969000000000168 Tranching, CDS and Asset Prices: How Financial Innovation Can Cause Bubbles and Crashes***by*Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos**786969000000000162 Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets***by*George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson**786969000000000156 Dynamics of Inductive Inference in a Unified Framework***by*Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler**786969000000000140 Contagion of a Crisis, Corporate Governance and Credit Rationing***by*Dong Chuhl Oh**786969000000000136 Essays on Microeconomics with Incomplete Information***by*Jie Zheng**786969000000000130 A Dynamic Quality Ladder Model with Entry and Exit: Exploring the Equilibrium Correspondence Using the Homotopy Method***by*Ron N. Borkovsky & Ulrich Doraszelski & Yaroslav (Steve) Kryukov**786969000000000126 Axiomatic Foundations of Multiplier Preferences***by*Tomasz Strzalecki**786969000000000121 Intangible Capital, Relative Asset Shortages and Bubbles***by*Stefano Giglio & Tiago Severo**786969000000000116 Evolution and the Growth Process: Natural Selection of Entrepreneurial Traits***by*Oded Galor & Stelios Michalopoulos**786969000000000111 Decentralization, Communication, and the Origins of Fluctuations***by*George-Marios Angeletos & Jennifer La'O**786969000000000106 History, Expectations, and Leadership in Evolution of Cooperation***by*Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson**786969000000000096 On the Likelihood of Cyclic Comparisons***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Uzi Segal**786969000000000090 Artistic Creation and Intellectual Property: A Professional Career Approach***by*Francisco Alcalá & Miguel González-Maestre**786969000000000082 What’s Intellectual Property Good for?***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**786969000000000073 Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less E ort? Incentive Reversal in Teams***by*Esteban F. Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan**786969000000000066 History-Dependent Risk Attitude***by*David Dillenberger & Kareen Rozen**786969000000000060 Default Penalty as a Selection Mechanism Among Multiple***by*Juergen Huber & Martin Shubik & Shyam Sunder**786969000000000054 Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi**786969000000000049 Cost Innovation: Schumpeter and Equilibrium - Part 1: Robinson Crusoe***by*Martin Shubik & William D. Sudderth**786969000000000045 Competing Conventions***by*Philip R. Neary**786969000000000041 A Paradox of Environmental Awareness Campaigns***by*Christos Koulovatianos**786969000000000036 Dynamic linear economies with social interactions***by*Onur Ozgur & Alberto Bisin**786969000000000030 Neuroeconomics?***by*David K Levine**786969000000000025 Managing Strategic Buyers***by*Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson**786969000000000020 Efficient Search by Committee***by*Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki**786969000000000008 Virtual Model Validation for Economics***by*David K Levine**786969000000000001 Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**661465000000001198 Overeagerness***by*Philipp Sadowski**661465000000001193 Ashamed to Be Selfish***by*Philipp Sadowski & David Dillenberger**661465000000001189 Contingent Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior***by*Philipp Sadowski**661465000000001185 Network Topology and Equilibrium Existence in Weighted Network Congestion Games***by*Igal Milchtaich**661465000000001179 A Political Theory of Populism***by*Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin**661465000000001171 A Dynamic Theory of Resource Wars***by*Daron Acemoglu & Michael Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski & Pierre Yared**661465000000001167 A Caricature (Model) of the World Economy***by*Ricardo J. Caballero**661465000000001154 Fraud Cycles***by*Jiong Gong & Preston McAfee & Michael A Williams

### 2010

**826 Anonymity versus punishments in ultimatum bargaining***by*Gary E Bolton & Rami Zuwick**814577000000000457 Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets***by*James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger**814577000000000452 Risk Preferences Are Not Time Preferences***by*James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger**814577000000000447 Certain and Uncertain Utility: The Allais Paradox and Five Decision Theory Phenomena***by*James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger**814577000000000437 Stochastic Approximation, Cooperative Dynamics and Supermodular Games***by*Michel Benaim & Mathieu Faure**814577000000000432 Colonel Blotto’s Top Secret Files***by*Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein**789 Evolutionary Drift an Equilibrium Selection***by*Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson**7644 Generalized Similarity Judgments: An Alternative Explanation for Choice Anomalies***by*John Leland**7637 Similarity and Decision Making Under Risk***by*Ariel Rubinstein**723 Word of Mouth Learning***by*Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg**661465000000001148 Strategic Thinking***by*Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri**661465000000001143 Price Competition under Limited Comparability***by*Michele Piccione & Ran Spiegler**661465000000001137 Where do preferences come from?***by*Franz Dietrich & Christian List**661465000000001110 Numerical Simulation of the Overlapping Generations Models with Indeterminacy***by*Zhigang Feng**661465000000001104 Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment***by*Roberto Galbiatiy & Karl Schlagz & Joel van der Weele**661465000000000393 Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure***by*J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil**661465000000000387 Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model***by*Ariel Rubinstein**661465000000000381 Rationalizable Strategic Behavior***by*D. B. Bernheim**661465000000000377 Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality***by*Robert J. Aumann**661465000000000355 Entropy and the value of information for investors***by*Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano**661465000000000351 Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets***by*Alexey I. Kushnir**661465000000000347 Charity as a Signal of Trustworthiness***by*Sebastian Fehrler**661465000000000343 The Case for Last-Second Bidding***by*Bryan Lim**661465000000000337 Existence and Testable Implications of Extreme Stable Matchings***by*Federico Echenique & SangMok Lee & M. Bumin Yenmez**661465000000000332 An Incomplete Information Justification of Symmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Games***by*Christoph Kuzmics & Brian W. Rogers**661465000000000327 Financing Speculative Booms***by*Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong