IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Complex Questionnaires


  • Jacob Glazer
  • Ariel Rubinstein


We study a principal–agent model in which the agent is boundedly rational in his ability to understand the principal's decision rule. The principal wishes to elicit an agent's true profile so as to determine whether or not to grant him a certain request. The principal designs a questionnaire and commits himself to accepting certain responses. In designing such a questionnaire, the principal takes into account the bounded rationality of the agent and wishes to reduce the success probability of a dishonest agent who is trying to game the system. It is shown that the principal can construct a sufficiently complex questionnaire that will allow him to respond optimally to agents who tell the truth and at the same time to almost eliminate the probability that a dishonest agent will succeed in cheating.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2013. "Complex Questionnaires," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000644, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000644

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2014. "Behavioral Implementation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 2975-3002, October.
    2. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
    3. Cabrales, Antonio & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 360-374.
    4. Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid, 2015. "Complexity and repeated implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 259-292.
    2. Ville Korpela, 2014. "All Deceptions Are Not Alike: Bayesian Mechanism Design with Social Norm Against Lying," Discussion Papers 95, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. repec:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201706)173:2_376:adanab_2.0.tx_2-j is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000644. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.