# Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

# STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series

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### 2015

**566 Projection Equilibrium: Definition and Applications to Social Investment and Persuasion***by*Kristóf Madarász

### 2014

**565 Reason-Based Rationalization***by*Franz Dietrich & Christian List

### 2013

**564 Peer Effects in Endogenous Networks***by*Timo Hiller & Timo Hiller

### 2012

**563 Conscience Accounting: Emotional Dynamics and Social Behavior***by*Uri Gneezy & Alex Imas & Kristóf Madarász

### 2011

**561 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?***by*Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts**560 Efficiency in Repeated Two-Action Games with Local Monitoring***by*Francesco Nava & Michele Piccione**549 Sales and Collusion in a Market with Storage***by*Francesco Nava & Pasquale Schiraldi

### 2010

**548 Screening with an Approximate Type Space***by*Kristóf Madarász & Andrea Prat**546 Spatial Asset Pricing: A First Step***by*Francois Ortalo-Magne & Andrea Prat

### 2009

**544 Religious Organizations***by*Gilat Levy & Ronnie Razin**543 Gradualism in Dynamic Agenda Formation***by*Gilat Levy & Ronnie Razin**542 Quantity Competition in Networked Markets Outflow and Inflow Competition***by*Francesco Nava

### 2008

**528 Statute Law or Case Law?***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni

### 2007

**514 The Political Economy of Housing Supply:Homeowners, Workers, and Voters***by*Francois Ortalo-Magne & Andrea Prat

### 2006

**511 Active Courts and Menu Contracts***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite

### 2005

**490 Characterizations of long-run producer optima and the short-runapproach to long-run market equilibrium: a general theory withapplications to peak-load pricing***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**489 The Wong-Viner Envelope Theorem for subdifferentiable functions***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**488 A Practical Short-run Approach to Market Equilibrium***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel

### 2004

**478 Knowledge Disclosure, Patents and Optimal Organization of Research and Development***by*Sudipto Bhattacharya & Sergei Guriev**473 Firm-Specific Training***by*Leonardo Felli & Christopher Harris**472 AGREEING NOW TO AGREE LATER: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**470 Public Education for the Minority,Private Education for the Majority***by*Gilat Levy**469 Financial Institutions and The Wealth of Nations: Tales of Development***by*Jian Tong & Chenggang Xu

### 2003

**459 Dynamic Yardstick Regulation***by*Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Soenje Reiche**458 Coordinating Tasks in M-Form and U-Form Organisations***by*Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland & Chenggang Xu**457 Careerist Judges***by*Gilat Levy**448 Endogenous Lobbying***by*Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo**447 Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Andrew Postlewaite**446 Efficiency and Equilibrium when Preferences are Time-Inconsistent***by*Erzo G J Luttmer & Thomas Mariotti**445 Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design***by*Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti**444 Investment Timing under Incomplete Information***by*Jean-Paul Decamps & Thomas Mariotti & Stephane Villeneuve

### 2002

**442 Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation***by*Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu**441 Credit Rationing, Wealth Inequality, and Allocation of Talent***by*Maitreesh Ghatak & Massimo Morelli & Tomas Sjostrom**440 Modelling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognise Equilibrium Patterns***by*Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein**439 The Wrong Kind of Transparency***by*Andrea Prat**431 Unforeseen Contingencies***by*Nabil J Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli

### 2001

**428 Self-Confidence and Survival***by*Heski Bar-Isaac**417 Continuity of the Equilibrium Price Density and its Uses in Peak-Load Pricing***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**414 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?***by*Leonardo Felli & Kevin Roberts**413 Ownership, Incentives and Monitoring***by*Chong-En Bai & Chenggang Xu**412 Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership***by*Patrick Bolton & Chenggang Xu**409 Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli

### 2000

**407 Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli**405 Efficiency Rents of Pumped-Storage Plants and their Uses for Operation and Investment Decisions***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**404 Strategic Consultation in the Presence of Career Concerns***by*Gilat Levy**401 Collective Bargaining under Complete Information***by*Carlos Diaz-Moreno & Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez**393 The Short-Run Approach to LRMC Pricing for Multiple Outputs with Nondifferentiable Costs***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel

### 1999

**375 On the Design of Hierarchies: Coordination Versus Specialization***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**372 Efficiency Rents of Storage Plants in Peak-Load Pricing, II: Hydroelectricity - (Now published as Efficiency rents of hydroelectric storage plants in continuous-time peak-load pricing, in The Current State of Economic Science, by S B Dahiya (ed.), vol.1, pp.453-480 (Spellbound Publications, Rohtak, 1999)***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**371 The Density Form of Equilibrium Prices in Continuous Time and Boiteuxs Solution to the Shifting-Peak Problem- (Now published as Boiteuxs solution to the shifting-peak problem and the equilibrium price density in continuous time, in Economic Theory, vol. 20 (2002), pp.503-537.)***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**369 Market Experimentation in a Dynamic Differentiated-Goods Duopoly***by*Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady**367 Dynamic Voting in Clubs***by*Kevin Roberts

### 1998

**366 Implementation and Renegotiation - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.)***by*Eric Maskin & John Moore**364 The Property-Rights Theory of the Firm with Endogenous Timing of Asset Purchase***by*Ben Lockwood & David de Meza**362 Costly Coasian Contracts***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli**361 Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli**358 Foundations of Incomplete Contracts - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.115-138.)***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**356 A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs***by*Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort**355 Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission***by*Timothy Besley & Rohini Pande**347 Berges Maximum Theorem With Two Topologies On The Action Set (Now published in Economics Letters, vol.61 (1999), pp.285-291.)***by*Anthony Horsley & Timothy Van Zandt & Andrew J Wrobel**346 Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore

### 1997

**341 Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality***by*Ben Polak**339 Weakening the Sure-Thing Principle: Decomposable Choice under Uncertainty***by*Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Ben Polak**337 A Model of a Predatory State***by*Boaz Moselle & Ben Polak**335 Analyzing the Case for Government Intervention in a Representative Democracy***by*Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate**334 Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy - (Now published in 'Review of Economic Studies', 68 (2001), pp.67-82.)***by*Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate**333 Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment***by*Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady**331 Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form - (Now published in 'Economics of Transition' (2201))***by*Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu**321 Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore

### 1996

**315 Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity***by*Jan Eeckhout**314 Friendships in Vertical Relations - (Now published under the title 'Renegotiation and Collusion in Organisations', in 'Journal of Economics and Management Strategy', 9(4)(Winter 2001), pp.453-483.)***by*Leonardo Felli & J M Villas-Boas**313 Costly Contingent Contracts***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli**312 A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions - (Now published in 'European Economics Review', vol.41(3/5), 1997, pp.461-473.)***by*Oliver Hart & R La Porta Drago & F Lopez-de-Silanes & John Moore**310 The Optimal Consumption Function in a Brownian Model of Accumulation, Part B: Existence of Solutions of Boundary Value Problems***by*Lucien Foldes**308 Competition, Investment and Vertical Integration***by*Gilles Chemla**305 Building Trust***by*Saikat Datta**304 On Connections Between Renegotiation Proof Sets of Long Finitely and Infinitely Repeated Games with Low Discounting***by*Saikat Datta**303 Preventing Collusion Through Discretion***by*Leonardo Felli**302 Comparative Statics for a Partial Equilibrium Model of Investment with Wicksell-Complementary Capital Inputs***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**301 Efficiency Rents of Storage Plants in Peak-Load Pricing, I: Pumped Storage***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**300 Uninterruptible Consumption, Concentrated Charges, and Equilibrium in the Commodity Space of Continuous Functions***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**299 The Wong-Viner Envelope Theorem or Nonsmooth Joint Costs, Rental Valuation and the Short-Run Approach to Long-Run Equilibrium***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**298 The Le Chatelier Principle can be 'Expected' to Hold Globally: Implications of Rationality in Constrained and Unconstrained Situations - (Now published in 'Journal of Economic Theory', 87 (1999), pp.416-428.)***by*Kevin Roberts**297 The Optimal Consumption Function in a Brownian Model of Accumulation Part A: The Consumption Function as Solution of a Boundary Value Problem***by*Lucien Foldes**293 Bargaining and Sharing Knowledge***by*Sudipto Bhattacharya & L-A Gérard-Varet & Claude d'Aspremont**292 The Governance of Exchanges: Members' Co-operatives Versus Outside Ownership***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore

### 1995

**289 Reputation and Allocation of Ownership***by*Maija Halonen**286 Roads to Equality: Wealth Distribution Dynamics with Public-Private Capital Complementarity***by*Francisco H.G. Ferreira**285 Credit Cycles - (Now published in 'Journal of Political Economy', vol.105(2), April 1997, pp.211-248.)***by*Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore**283 Objective Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility - (Now published in 'Social Choice and Welfare',14 (1997), pp.79-96.)***by*Kevin Roberts**280 A Matching Model with Wage Announcement***by*Espen R. Moen

### 1994

**279 Exploring a Branching Structure: A Bandit Problem with Correlated Pay-offs***by*Alison Hole & Godfrey Keller**277 Job Matching, Learning and the Distribution of Surplus (Revised version published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.104 (1996), pp.838-868 (new title: Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital.)***by*Leonardo Felli & Christopher Harris**274 Wage and Employment Determination through Non-Cooperative Bargaining***by*Kevin Roberts**273 Exchange Rates and the Matrix-Tree Theorem***by*Norman Biggs**272 The Algebra of Knowledge: Critique and Reformulation***by*Kaushik Basu

### 1993

**267 Incomplete Written Contracts: Endogenous Agency Problems (Revised version, 'Describability and Agency Problems', published in European Economic Review, vol.42 (1998), pp.35-59.)***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli**264 Recession Dynamics Following a Price Shock in a Transition Economy***by*Stanislaw Gomulka & John Lane**263 Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics (1994), vol.109, pp.1085-1124.)***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli**261 Strategic Experimentation - (Now published in 'Econometrica',(March 1999)***by*Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris**260 A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly***by*Michael A. Raith**259 Incomplete Information Bargaining and Business Cycles***by*Daron Acemoglu

### 1992

**257 Optimal Selling Procedures with Fixed Costs***by*Francesca Cornelli**256 The Firm as a Communication Network - (Now published in 'Quarterly Journal of Economics' CIX(4) (December 1994), pp.809-839. Reprinted in Mark Casson (ed.). 'The Theory of the Firm'(Edward Elgar Publishing, 1997)***by*Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont**255 Imperfect Capital Markets and Persistence of Initial Wealth Inequalities***by*Thomas Piketty**253 Valued Opinions or Opinionated Values: The Double Aggregation Problem (Now published in K. Basu, P. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura (eds.), Choice, Welfare and Development: Essays in Honour of Amartya Sen (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994).)***by*Kevin Roberts**252 The Art of Smooth Pasting (Now published in Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics 55 (Harwood Academic Publishers GbmH, Poststr. 22, 7000 Chur, Switzerland), 1993. ISBN: 3-7186-5384-2, ISSN: 0191-1708.)***by*Avinash Dixit**250 The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform (Now published in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol.8, no.3, (1992), pp. 523-546.)***by*Philippe Aghion & Oliver Hart & John Moore**249 On the Local Stability of Sunspot Equilibria Under Adaptive Learning Rules - (Now published in 'Journal of Economic Theory', vol.64 (1994), pp.142-161.)***by*George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja**248 Adaptive Learning and Expectational Stability: An Introduction - (Now published as Ch.4 in 'Learning Rationality in Economics', A Kirman and M Salmon (eds), 1995, Basil Blackwell, Oxford), pp.102-126.)***by*George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja**247 Localization of Closedness and Continuity Properties, with Applications to Preferences and Production Sets - (Now published as 'Localisation of continuity to bounded sets for nonmetrisable vector topologies and its applications to economic equilibrium theory', in Indagationes Mathematicae (New Series), 11 (2000), pp.53-61.)***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**246 Continuity of Demand and the Direct Approach to Equilibrium Existence in Dual Banach Commodity Spaces - (Now published as 'Berge's Maximum Theorem with two topologies on the action set', in Economics Letters, 61 (1998), pp.285-291.)***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**240 Irreversible Investment with Uncertainty and Scale Economies***by*Avinash Dixit**239 Outside Options in a Bargaining Model with Decay in the Size of the Cake (Now published in Economics Letters 40 (1992), pp.417-421.)***by*Alberto Dalmazzo**238 An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (Now published in American Economic Review, vol.82, no.5 (1992), pp.1254-1278.)***by*Roger Guesnerie**237 Rationalizability, Strong Rationality and Expectational Stability (Now published in Games and Economic Behavior, Special Issue on Learning Dynamics, vol.5 (Oct. 1993), pp.632-646).)***by*George W. Evans & Roger Guesnerie**236 Local Convergence of Recursive Learning to Steady States and Cycles in Stochastic Nonlinear Models - (Now published in 'Econometrica', vol.63 (1995), pp.195-206.)***by*George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja

### 1991

**235 Implementation in Environments with Complete Information (Now published as 'Implementation, Contracts and Renegotiation in Environments with Complete Information' in J-J Laffont (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Invited Papers to the World Congress of the Econometric Society, vol.I (1992), pp.182-282.)***by*John Moore**234 The Firm as a Collection of Assets (Now published in European Economic Review, vol.36, Nos.2/3 (1992), pp.493-507.)***by*John Moore**233 A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**232 Price Singularities: Representation vs. Exclusion - (Now published as 'Boiteux's solution to the shifting-peak problem and the equilibrium price density in continuous time', in Economic Theory, vol. 20 (2002), pp.503-537.)***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**231 Marginal Analysis and Bewley Equilibria: The Use of Subgradients***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**226 Toward a Theory of International Currency (Now published in Review of Economic Studies 60 (1993), pp.283-307.)***by*Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama**223 On the Preservation of Deterministic Cycles when some Agents Perceive them to be Random Fluctuations (Now published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol.17 (1993), pp.705-721.)***by*George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja & Thomas J. Sargent**222 On the Stability of Rationing Scheme***by*Aditya Goenka

### 1990

**218 Search for a Theory of Money (Now published as 'A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics' in The American Economic Review, vol.83, No.1, (March 1993), pp.63-77.)***by*Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Randall Wright**217 A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**215 Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**212 Learning, Convergence, and Stability with Multiple Rational Expectations Equilibria - (Now published in 'European Economic Review', vol.38 (1994), pp.1071-1098.)***by*George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja**210 Price-Quantity Decisions as Learning Instruments***by*Steve Alpern & Dennis J. Snower

### 1989

**209 The Theory of Union Behaviour: Labour Hoarding and Endogenous Hysteresis***by*Kevin Roberts**206 Culture and Optimality***by*Max Steuer**205 Implementing Alternative Voting in Kingmaker Trees (Now published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2 (1990), pp.325-336.)***by*J.V. Howard**202 Expectation Calculation and Macroeconomic Dynamics (Now published in American Economic Review, (March 1992).)***by*George W. Evans & Gary Ramey**201 Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information***by*Carolyn Pitchik**200 Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Model***by*Klaus M. Schmidt**199 The Envelope Theorem, Joint Costs, and Equilibrium***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**198 Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games***by*Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti**196 Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem (Now published in Econometrica, vol.59, No.1 (Jan.1991), pp.1-23.)***by*Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff**195 Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium (Now published in Econometrica, vol.59, no.1 (Jan.1991), pp.25-29.)***by*Andrew Caplin & Barry Nalebuff**194 Cycles in Extensive Form Perfect Information Games (Now published in Journal of Mathematical Analysis, vol.159, no.1 (1991), pp.1-17.)***by*Steve Alpern**193 Bargaining Without Commitment (Now published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2 (1990), pp.291-297.)***by*Abhinay Muthoo**192 Default and Renegotiation: A DynamicModel of Debt - (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.113(1), February 1998, pp.1-41.)***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**190 Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning***by*David Canning**189 On the Robustness of Bubbles in Linear RE Models (Now published in International Economic Review, vol.33, No.1 (1992), pp.1-14.)***by*George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja**188 Remarks on the Logic of Agreeing to Disagree Type Results (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), pp.184-193.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**186 The Existence of an Equilibrium Price for Marginal Cost Pricing - (Now published as Boiteuxs solution to the shifting-peak problem and the quilibriumprice density in continuous time, in Economic Theory, vol. 20 (2002), pp.503-537.)***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel

### 1988

**185 Limit Points in a Bargaining Model of a Decentralised Market I (Revised version now published in Economic Theory 3 (1993), pp.353-363.)***by*Abhinay Muthoo**183 Rationality and Game Theory when Players are Turing Machines***by*David Canning**181 Comments on the interpretation of game theory (Now published in Econometrica, 59 (1991), pp.909-924.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein**176 The Innovative Rate and Kaleckis Theory of Trend, Unemployment and the Business Cycle (Now published in Economica, 57 (1990), pp.525-540.)***by*Roy O. Davies & Stanislaw Gomulka & Adam Ostaszewski**175 Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization (Now published in Econometrica, vol.58, No.5 (1990), pp.1083-1099.)***by*John Moore & Rafael Repullo**174 Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (Now published in Journal of Political Economy, vol.98, No.6 (1990), pp.1119-1158.)***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**173 Active Learning about the Demand Distribution (Now published in Methods of Operations Research, 63, U. Rieder, P. Gessner, A. Peyerimhoff and F.J. Rademacher (eds.), (Anton Hain, Ulm, 1989), pp.81-92.)***by*Diane J. Reyniers**172 A Social Choice Rule and its Implementation in Perfect Equilibrium (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 56 (1992), pp.142-159.)***by*J.V. Howard**171 Cooperations in the Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Theory and Decision, vol.24 (1988), pp.203-213.)***by*J.V. Howard**170 Game Theory and Social Contract Mark II***by*Ken Binmore**168 Local Compactness of Choice Sets, Continuity of Demand on Prices, and the Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel**167 Common Knowledge and Game Theory***by*Ken Binmore & Adam Brandenburger

### 1987

**165 A Game with Almost Common Knowledge: An Example (Now published in American Economic Review, 79 (1989), pp.385-391.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein**164 Interactive High-Low Search: The Case of Lost Sales (Now published in Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol.40,No.8 (1989), pp.769-780.)***by*Diane J. Reyniers**163 Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), pp.63-78.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**162 Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), pp.145-153.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein**159 Opting Out: Bazaars versus "Hi Tech" Markets***by*Avner Shaked**157 A Mixed Strategy Minimax Theorem (Now published in SIAM J. Control and Optimization, vol.26, No.6 (1988), pp.1357-1361.)***by*Steve Alpern & Shmuel Gal**154 Multiproduct Firms and Market Structure (Now published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, (November 1989), pp.753-770.)***by*Avner Shaked & John Sutton**150 The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction (Now published in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (eds.), (Macmillan Press, 1987), pp.17-32.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein**149 Remodeled Rational Players (Now published as Modeling Rational Players II, in Economics and Philosopy, 4 (1988), pp.9-55.)***by*Ken Binmore**148 Perfect Equilibrium Histories of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.47, No.1, (1989), pp.218-227.)***by*Tilman Börgers**147 Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behaviour: An Introduction (Now published in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: John Robinson and Beyond, edited by G. Feiwel, (1989), pp.243-25.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein**146 Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LV (1988), pp.555-572.)***by*Ching-to Ma**141 The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata (Now published in Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp.1259-1282.)***by*Dilip Abreu & Ariel Rubinstein

### 1986

**92 Price Destabilizing Speculation (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (october 1986).)***by*Oliver Hart & David Kreps**135 Stopping Agents Cheat (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol.46, No.2, (Dec.1988), pp.355-372.)***by*Ching-to Ma & John Moore**134 Subgame Perfect Implementation (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.5 (1988), pp.1191-1220.)***by*John Moore & Rafael Repullo**133 Modeling Rational Players (Now published as Modeling Rational Players I, in Economics and Philosophy, 3 (1987), pp.179-214.)***by*Ken Binmore**132 The Formal Theory of Electricity Pricing and Investment I: A Continuous-Time Model of Deterministic Production***by*Anthony Horsley & Andrew J Wrobel

### 1985

**128 Games with Repeated Decisions (Now published in SIAM J. Control and Optimization, vol.26, No.2 (1988), pp.468-477.)***by*Steve Alpern**125 Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.53, No.176 (1986), pp.709-724.)***by*John Sutton**124 An Outside Option Experiment (Now published in Rand Journal of Economics, vol.21 (Spring 1990), pp.45-62.)***by*Ken Binmore & Avner Shaked & John Sutton**120 Perfect Equilibrium, Spatial Competition and Multiple Outlets (Now published (with D. Neven) as Can Price Competition Dominate Market Segmentation? in The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.36, 4 (1988), pp.431-442.)***by*Xavier Martinez**118 The Optimal Linear Income Tax Revisited (Now published in Journal of Public Economics, 31 (1986), pp.163-179.)***by*Martin Hellwig**117 Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets (Now published as 2 papers (see also TE/84/103): Security Equilibrium, in Review of Economic Studies, 55 (1988), pp.33-48; and Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets in Review of Economic Studies, 55 (1988), pp.17-31.)***by*Ken Binmore & M.J. Herrero**115 Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiations (Now published in Econometrica, vol.56, No.4 (1988), pp.755-785.)***by*Oliver Hart & John Moore**114 Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence Revisited***by*Giacomo Bonanno**113 Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure (Now published in Journal of Industrial Economics, vol.36, No.2 (1987), pp.131-146.)***by*Avner Shaked**112 The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (Now published in Rand Journal of Economics, vol.17 (1986), pp.176-188.)***by*Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**109 Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, No.39 (1986),pp.176-188.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein

### 1984

**99 Fairness or Gamesmanship in Bargaining: An Experimental Study (Now published in American Economic Review, vol.75, (Dec. 1985), pp. 1178-1180.)***by*Ken Binmore & Avner Shaked & John Sutton**98 The Semi-Walrasian Economy***by*Avner Shaked & John Sutton**97 Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (Revised version now published in Review of Economic Studies, 1985).)***by*Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig**95 Power and Agrarian Relations: Some Concepts and Measurements (Now published in Agrarian Power and Agricultura Productivity in South Asia, edited by M. Desai and A. Rudra, (U.P.C., Berkeley, CA, 1984); and (OUP, Delhi, 1984).)***by*Meghnad Desai**91 Equilibrium in a Market With Sequential Bargaining (Now published in Econometrica 53 (1985), pp. 1133-1150.)***by*Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky**88 The Existence of Nash Equilibria in a Model of Growth with Altruism between Generations (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.349-367.)***by*Wolfgang Leininger**108 Game Theory and The Social Contract: Part I***by*Ken Binmore**106 Risk Aversion Without Diminishing Marginal Utility***by*Menahem E. Yaari**104 Equilibrium in a Market With Sequential Bargaining and No Transaction Costs is Walrasian***by*Douglas Gale**103 Frictionless Non-Walrasian Markets (Now published as 2 papers (see also TE/85/117): Security Equilibrium, in Review of Economic Studies, 55 (1988), pp.33-48; and Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets in Review of Economic Studies, 55 (1988), pp.17-31.)***by*Ken Binmore & M.J. Herrero**102 Contracting Between Two Parties with Private Information (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.55 (Jan.1988), pp.49-69.)***by*John Moore**101 The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical Integration (Now published in Journal of Political Economy (August 1986))***by*Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart