A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly
Under which circumstances do oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs? We present a general model which includes virtually all models of the existing literature on information sharing as special cases. The analysis reveals that in contrast to the apparent inconclusivenss of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be obtained. Most existing results are generalized and some interpretations are corrected, leading to a single general theory of the topic.
|Date of creation:||Mar 1993|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cep:stitep:260. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.