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Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information

  • Carolyn Pitchik

I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be non-monotonic functions of a bidder\\'s type. Parameters permit the existence of multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding functions that differ in allocation, efficiency and revenue. The sequence of sale affects the competition for a good and therefore also affects revenue and the prices of each good in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes of bidders. The sequence of sale may affect prices and revenue even when the number of bidders is large relative to the number of goods. If a particular good, say α, is allocated to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale, then auction revenue and the price of good α is higher when good α is sold first.

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Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series with number 201.

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Date of creation: 1989
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Handle: RePEc:cep:stitep:201
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp

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