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Content
2026, Volume 160, Issue C
- S0899825626001132 Regulating investments when both costs and need are private
by Garrett, Daniel F. & Panova, Elena
- S0899825626001259 Stochastic sequential screening
by Li, Hao & Shi, Xianwen
- S0899825626001260 Legitimate decision authority and motivation in organizations
by Herz, Holger & Zihlmann, Christian
- S0899825626001272 Elections with job-motivated bureaucrats
by Forand, Jean Guillaume
- S0899825626001284 Motivation complementarities in prosocial behavior: Evidence from social networks of blood donors
by Bruhin, Adrian & Haenni, Simon & Jiang, Lingqing & Roethlisberger, Adrian & Buchli, Regula & Frey, Beat M. & Goette, Lorenz
- S0899825626001351 Multi-agent contract design with a budget
by Goel, Sumit & Hann-Caruthers, Wade
- S0899825626001363 Tournaments with managerial discretion
by Xiao, Peiran & Zaman, Hashim
- S0899825626001399 Competing for power in multilateral negotiations under majority and unanimity rules
by Baranski, Andrzej & Reuben, Ernesto
- S0899825626001405 Eliciting moral preferences under image concerns: Theory and experiment
by Bénabou, Roland & Falk, Armin & Henkel, Luca & Tirole, Jean
- S0899825626001417 The effects of global and local heterogeneity on cooperation in multi-level public goods: experimental evidence
by Bjedov, Tjaša & Lapointe, Simon & Madiès, Thierry & Masclet, David & Tisserand, Jean-Christian
- S0899825626001429 Maxmin expected utility as resulting from disagreement among experts
by Alon, Shiri & Gayer, Gabrielle
- S0899825626001430 Corrigendum to “Two-person bargaining when the disagreement point is private information” [Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 150 (2025), 387-400]
by van Damme, Eric & Lang, Xu
2026, Volume 159, Issue C
- 1-19 Bureaucratic norms and dynamic Bayesian persuasion
by Zhou, Yihang
- 20-55 The resolution of uncertainty in the value and probability domains
by Lee, Eungik & Ngangoue, Kathleen & Schotter, Andrew
- 56-70 Motives for delegating financial decisions
by Freer, Mikhail & Friedman, Daniel & Weidenholzer, Simon
- 71-88 Network attrition: Theory and policy implications
by Bravard, Christophe & Chaudhuri, Promit K. & Sarangi, Sudipta & Tzavellas, Hector
- 89-112 Dynamic coordination with switching costs
by Ballard, Joe S. & Boosey, Luke
- 113-130 Algorithmic cooperation: A comparison with human play in the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
by Kasberger, Bernhard & Martin, Simon & Normann, Hans-Theo & Werner, Tobias
- 131-143 New methods to compensate artists in music streaming platforms
by Bergantiños, Gustavo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
- 144-155 Ranking teams
by Hamdan, Adam
- 156-178 Long-run efficiency with local interactions and heterogeneous types
by Lillethun, Erik
- 179-197 Optimal mechanisms for selling market segmentation
by Terstiege, Stefan
- 198-224 Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers
by Shinozaki, Hiroki
- 225-240 Fair allocation in hierarchies
by Ju, Biung-Ghi & Jung, Soojeong & Song, Hokyu & Jo, Kyubang
- 241-267 Rewarding success and failure: Moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation
by Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques & Rodivilov, Alexander
- 268-285 Memory overload and asymmetric underreaction
by Goette, Lorenz & Han, Hua-Jing & Leung, Benson Tsz Kin
- 286-309 Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
by Bouchta, Mohamed & Doghmi, Ahmed & Ziad, Abderrahmane
- 310-319 Fair and efficient allocation of indivisible items under category constraints
by Igarashi, Ayumi & Meunier, Frédéric
- 320-328 Weak* dominance
by Luo, Xiao & Qiao, Yongchuan
- 329-392 The persistence of disadvantages: Theory and experiment
by Sharma, Nishtha
- 393-424 Repression and autocratic consolidation
by Di Lonardo, Livio & Sun, Jessica S. & Tyson, Scott A.
- 425-441 Optimal verification of (mis)information in networks
by Merlino, Luca P. & Tabasso, Nicole
- 442-443 Which probability measures are strict correlated equilibria?
by Kizilkale, Can & Rodriguez, Anthony & Vohra, Rakesh V.
- 444-482 Information paths and learning in games: Experimental evidence
by Jiao, Peiran & Nax, Heinrich H. & Zong, Jichuan
- 483-491 How to replace public communication with private one
by Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter
- 492-545 Contagion-based safety premium in bank networks
by Fan, Zhongjie & He, Ping & Liu, Zehao
- 546-563 Disclosure-proof correlated equilibria
by Saas, Scott
- 564-583 Kuhn’s theorem for games of the extensive form with unawareness
by Foo, Ki Vin & Schipper, Burkhard C.
- 584-603 On the strategyproof allocation of items under a budget constraint
by Cembrano, Javier & Klimm, Max & Knaack, Martin
- 604-624 On the political economy of nonlinear income taxation
by Berliant, Marcus & Gouveia, Miguel
2026, Volume 158, Issue C
- 1-34 Evaluating non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanisms: Theory and experiment
by Gui, Shan & Houser, Daniel
- 35-62 Compellingness in Nash implementation
by Chatterji, Shurojit & Kunimoto, Takashi & Ramos, Paulo
- 63-79 Istanbul flower auction: The need for speed
by Hafalir, Isa & Kesten, Onur & Luo, Donglai & Sherstyuk, Katerina & Tao, Cong
- 80-113 Welfare properties of the Taiwan mechanism
by Wolff, Ilan
- 114-121 When is it (im)possible to respect all individuals’ preferences under uncertainty?
by Nakamura, Kensei
- 122-131 Failing to correctly aggregate signals
by Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel
- 132-141 Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities: A limit theorem
by Busetto, Francesca & Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Julien, Ludovic & Turchet, Damiano
- 142-166 Approximating competitive equilibrium by Nash welfare
by Garg, Jugal & Tao, Yixin & Végh, László A.
- 167-190 Neural correlates of interactions between adaptive learning and hierarchical reasoning in repeated strategic games
by Feng, Jun & Jin, Jia & Zhao, Sasa & Derrington, Edmund & Qin, Xiangdong & Fu, Shiguang & Shen, Qiang & Dreher, Jean-Claude
- 191-218 Guilt and fairness
by Stringhi, Alessandro
- 219-236 Morality meets risk: What makes a good excuse for selfishness
by Dong, Wanxin & Zheng, Jiakun
- 237-259 Representation in collective policymaking
by Gibbs, Daniel & Judd, Gleason
- 260-271 The quasi-prekernel for cooperative games
by Kong, Qianqian & Peters, Hans & Sun, Hao
- 272-282 The case for lobbying transparency
by Zerbini, Antoine
- 283-298 River-sharing problem with floods
by Oishi, Takayuki & Tajika, Tomoya
- 299-316 The effect of exit rights on cost-based procurement contracts
by Andrade, Rodrigo & Castro-Pires, Henrique & Moreira, Humberto
- 317-329 Reduced strategies and cognitive hierarchies in the extensive and normal form
by Battigalli, Pierpaolo
- 330-347 The effects of induced emotions on punishment and reward
by Drouvelis, Michalis & Grosskopf, Brit
- 348-366 Efficient equilibrium in submodular global games of entry
by Amir, Rabah & Harrison, Rodrigo & Jara-Moroni, Pedro
- 367-382 Competitive limit of competing auctions
by Ma, Zizhen & Riquelme, Nicolás
- 383-401 A simultaneous analysis of turnout and voting under proportional representation: Theory and experiments
by Kamm, Aaron & Schram, Arthur
- 402-418 Competing for influence in networks through strategic targeting
by Comola, Margherita & Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Villeval, Marie Claire
- 419-440 Potentials in social environments
by Demuynck, Thomas & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Seel, Christian
- 441-461 Designing Heaven’s will: The job assignment in the Chinese imperial civil service
by Bó, Inácio & Chen, Li
- 462-487 Lucky but confident –The effect of confidence on meritocratic beliefs and preferences for redistribution
by Hansson, Kajsa & Sund, Oda Kristine Storstad
- 488-504 When information and communication are both costly
by Safi, Shahir
- 505-526 On the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium under the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism
by Cheng, Yao & Wang, Dazhong & Yu, Jingsheng
- 527-546 Substitutes for nonunitary many-to-many matching with contracts
by Bando, Keisuke & Hirai, Toshiyuki
- 547-562 Two-player binary global games without dominance solvable states
by Park, In-Uck & Smyrniotis, Efthymios
- 563-583 Persuasion of interacting receivers
by Zeng, Yishu
- 584-604 The evolution of strategies in repeated 2 × 2 anti-coordination games
by Wu, Jiabin
- 605-621 Authority measure for opinion dynamics
by Milchtaich, Igal & Peretz, Ron & Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
- 622-629 The effort-maximizing move order in tullock contests
by Gao, Lei & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei
- 630-656 Strategic formation of production networks
by Mandel, Antoine & Nguyen, Van-Quy & Dong-Xuan, Bach
- 657-683 A model of participatory persuasion
by Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng
- 684-690 Delay in social learning
by Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
- 691-716 Caps on bids in all-pay contests with identity-dependent externalities
by Kovenock, Dan & Song, Jian & Trevisan, Francesco
- 717-736 Transparency and information acquisition in college admissions
by Koh, Youngwoo & Lim, Wooyoung
- 737-762 Eliciting and distinguishing between weak and incomplete preferences: Theory, experiment and computation
by Gerasimou, Georgios
- 763-786 Information manipulation of wishful thinkers
by Filiz-Ozbay, Emel & Liu, Zhenxun
- 787-814 Cheap talk and lie detection
by Sadakane, Hitoshi & Tam, Yin Chi
- 815-826 Competition in persuasion in the attention economy
by Innocenti, Federico
2026, Volume 157, Issue C
- 1-21 Algorithmic collusion and a folk theorem from learning with bounded rationality
by Cartea, Álvaro & Chang, Patrick & Penalva, José & Waldon, Harrison
- 22-33 Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences
by Erkut, Hande & Kübler, Dorothea
- 34-49 Outcome destabilization
by Dilmé, Francesc
- 50-70 Conventions in large games with randomly drawn payoffs
by Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji
- 71-87 Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
by Kwon, Hyukjun & Shorrer, Ran I.
- 88-108 Duality in financial networks
by Ketelaars, Martijn W. & Borm, Peter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
- 109-124 Timing and skewness of information revelation: Evidence on information structures and compound lotteries
by Diecidue, Enrico & Langer, Thomas & Nolte, Sven & Riedmiller, Sebastian & Schneider, Judith C.
- 125-137 Strategyproof mechanism for two heterogeneous facilities with constant approximation ratio
by Li, Minming & Lu, Pinyan & Sha, Xingchen & Yao, Yuhao & Zhang, Jialin
- 138-152 Algorithms and complexity for computing Nash equilibria in adversarial team games
by Anagnostides, Ioannis & Kalogiannis, Fivos & Panageas, Ioannis & Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Emmanouil-Vasileios & Mcaleer, Stephen
- 153-185 Strategy vs. direct-response method: evidence from a large online experiment on simple social dilemmas
by Roel, Marcus & Chen, Zhuoqiong
- 186-225 Present-bias and the value of sophistication: Splurging vs. smoothing
by Acharya, Subas & Jimenez-Gomez, David & Rachinskii, Dmitrii & Rivera, Alejandro
- 226-236 A generalization of von Neumann’s reduction from the assignment problem to zero-sum games
by Adler, Ilan & Bullinger, Martin & Vazirani, Vijay V.
- 237-252 Privately designed correlated equilibrium
by Carmona, Guilherme & Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
- 253-262 Success functions in large contests
by Azrieli, Yaron & Chambers, Christopher P.
- 263-285 Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
by Athanasoglou, Stergios & Bonkoungou, Somouaoga
- 286-297 Equilibrium cycle: A “Dynamic” equilibrium
by Walunj, Tushar Shankar & Singhal, Shiksha & Kavitha, Veeraruna & Nair, Jayakrishnan
- 298-321 Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price auction
by Hwang, Sung-Ha & Koh, Youngwoo & Baik, Sosung
- 322-350 Adapting stable matchings to evolving preferences
by Bredereck, Robert & Chen, Jiehua & Knop, Dušan & Luo, Junjie & Niedermeier, Rolf
- 351-375 Transaction fee mechanisms robust to welfare-increasing collusion
by Gafni, Yotam & Yaish, Aviv
- 376-378 Introduction to 25+ years of quantal response equilibrium
by Battaglini, Marco & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 379-394 Rent dissipation and streamlined costs: Laboratory experiments
by Holt, Charles A. & Smith, Angela M.
- 395-417 An experimental study of prisoners' dilemma and stag hunt games played by teams of players
by Kim, Jeongbin & Palfrey, Thomas R.
- 418-439 High-stakes failures of backward induction
by Klein Teeselink, Bouke & van Dolder, Dennie & van den Assem, Martijn J. & Dana, Jason D.
- 440-463 Endogenous barriers to learning
by Compte, Olivier
- 464-479 Pork barrel politics, voter turnout, and inequality: An experimental study
by Großer, Jens & Giertz, Thorsten
- 480-495 Electoral accountability in the lab
by Martinelli, César & Sebastián Esandi, Naila C.
- 496-515 Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box
by Liu, Shuige & Maccheroni, Fabio
- 516-534 The refinement of Nash equilibrium based on equilibrium models of imperfectly rational behavior
by Velez, Rodrigo A. & Brown, Alexander L.
- 535-570 On the smooth unfolding of bifurcations in quantal-response equilibria
by Harris, Adam & McCallum, Scott & Harré, Michael S.
- 571-591 Quantal response equilibrium with a continuum of types: Characterization and nonparametric identification
by Friedman, Evan & Gonçalves, Duarte
- 592-618 Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: The missing manual
by Bland, James R. & Turocy, Theodore L.
- 619-636 Bayesian inference for Quantal Response Equilibrium in normal-form games
by Bland, James R.
- 637-659 Non-parametric identification and testing of quantal response equilibrium
by Hoelzemann, Johannes & Webb, Ryan & Xie, Erhao
2026, Volume 156, Issue C
- 1-13 Choice and welfare under social constraints
by Ribeiro, Mauricio
- 14-34 Provoking the opposition
by Kocak, Korhan
- 35-57 Risk-taking in financial networks
by Belhaj, Mohamed & Bourlès, Renaud & Deroïan, Frédéric
- 58-63 A note on the non-coincidence of the core and the bargaining set in many-to-one assignment markets
by Atay, Ata & Núñez, Marina & Solymosi, Tamás
- 64-81 Improving the deferred acceptance with minimal compromise
by Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz & Dur, Umut & Gitmez, A. Arda & Yılmaz, Özgür
- 82-97 Marginal contribution and singleton cores in one-sided matching and assignment
by Cho, Hyunjun & Kim, Jin Yeub & Park, Jaeok
- 98-108 Payoff continuity in games of incomplete information across models of knowledge
by Kambhampati, Ashwin
- 109-134 Extensive form games with incentive stage-bidding: An emergence of non-cooperative cooperation
by Le Roux, Stéphane & Goranko, Valentin
- 135-148 When do prediction markets return average beliefs? Experimental evidence
by Mantovani, Marco & Filippin, Antonio
- 149-163 Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games
by García-Pola, Bernardo & Iriberri, Nagore
2026, Volume 155, Issue C
- 1-9 The topology of poker
by Bartholdi, Laurent & Mikhailov, Roman
- 10-26 A maximal domain for weak stochastic dominance strategy-proofness of the extended probabilistic serial correspondence
by Yun, Kiyong & Chun, Youngsub
- 27-54 A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts
by Saran, Rene
- 55-69 Information design in the principal-agent problem
by Babichenko, Yakov & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Xu, Haifeng & Zabarnyi, Konstantin
- 70-88 Single-crossing dominance: A preference lattice
by Curello, Gregorio & Sinander, Ludvig
- 89-106 The art of concession in General Lotto games
by Chandan, Rahul & Paarporn, Keith & Kovenock, Dan & Alizadeh, Mahnoosh & Marden, Jason R.
- 107-148 Pricing skewed assets in multi-asset experimental markets
by Zhao, Shuchen
- 149-166 Sequential creation of surplus and the Shapley value
by Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David
- 167-191 Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment
by Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter
- 192-211 Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence
by Baumann, Leonie
- 212-227 Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: A characterization result
by Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc
- 228-249 Indignation and the evolution of cooperation norms
by Li, Xueheng
- 250-266 Preconvex games
by Bahel, Eric & Trudeau, Christian & Wang, Haoyu
- 267-269 Corrigendum to “Values for environments with externalities – the average approach” [Games Econ. Behav. 108 (2018) 49–64.]
by Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David
- 270-286 Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices
by Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars
- 287-309 Group incentive-compatible allocation of discrete resources when ownership is partitioned
by Ishida, Wataru & Park, Changwoo
- 310-320 Exact Nash-like solutions of blockchain gap games
by Noguchi, Mitsunori
2025, Volume 154, Issue C
- 1-15 Strategic mobilization of voters
by Holburn, Guy & Raiha, Davin
- 16-52 Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences
by Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Özbilen, Seçkin
- 53-61 A direct proof of the short-side advantage in random matching markets
by Mauras, Simon & Prałat, Paweł & Vetta, Adrian
- 62-78 Naive analytics: The strategic advantage of algorithmic heuristics
by Berman, Ron & Heller, Yuval
- 79-96 Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience
by Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian & Huck, Steffen & Humphreys, Macartan
- 97-118 Rationalizing sharing rules
by Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol & Østerdal, Lars Peter
- 119-128 Equilibrium and social norms
by Anderson, Robert M. & Duanmu, Haosui
- 129-148 Interest group information in elections
by How Choon, Thea
- 149-158 Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation
by Cheng, Xiaoyu
- 159-174 Non-isolation, reversals, and social preference
by Cheung, Paul H.Y. & Ellis, Keaton
- 175-199 Material incentives and effort choice: Evidence from an online experiment across countries
by Davies, Elwyn & Fafchamps, Marcel
- 200-207 A concavity in the value of information
by Whitmeyer, Mark
- 208-225 Approximately fair and population consistent budget division via simple payment schemes
by Aziz, Haris & Lederer, Patrick & Lu, Xinhang & Suzuki, Mashbat & Vollen, Jeremy
- 226-245 Teams formation: Efficiency and approximate fairness
by Bogomolnaia, Anna & Baklanov, Artem & Victorova, Elizaveta
- 246-266 Who gets the credit? Credit attribution, spillovers, and inefficiency in teams
by Ozerturk, Saltuk & Yildirim, Huseyin
- 267-284 Information unraveling and limited depth of reasoning
by Benndorf, Volker & Kübler, Dorothea & Normann, Hans-Theo
- 285-301 BAR Nash equilibrium and application to blockchain design
by Gorelkina, Olga & Laraki, Rida & Reynouard, Maxime
- 302-328 Reasoning about your own future mistakes
by Meier, Martin & Perea, Andrés
- 329-350 Evidence games: Lying aversion and commitment
by Osun, Elif B. & Ozbay, Erkut Y.
- 351-376 Stochastic adaptive learning with committed players in games with strict Nash equilibria
by Funai, Naoki
- 377-395 Robust price discrimination
by Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Madmon, Omer & Tennenholtz, Moshe
- 396-410 Unfounded opinion's curse
by Li, King King & Suzuki, Toru
- 411-439 Markovian persuasion with stochastic revelations
by Lehrer, Ehud & Shaiderman, Dimitry
2025, Volume 153, Issue C
- 1-9 No trade under verifiable information
by Galanis, Spyros
- 10-29 Optimizing successive incentives: Rewarding the past or motivating the future?
by Gudmundsson, Jens & Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter
- 30-41 Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and the core in matching problems with transfers
by Morimoto, Shuhei
- 42-66 The matching benefits of market thickness
by Loertscher, Simon & Muir, Ellen V.
- 67-93 “Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted” - Comment
by Brooksby, Austin & Meyer, Jacob & Rentschler, Lucas & Smith, Vernon & Spofford, Robbie
- 94-112 Favor exchange with private costs: An experiment
by Degan, Arianna & Li, Yushen & Xie, Huan
- 113-130 Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates
by Brandt, Felix & Dong, Chris & Peters, Dominik
- 131-144 Data provision to an informed seller
by Ichihashi, Shota & Smolin, Alex
- 145-163 Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences
by Fischer, Sabine & Grosch, Kerstin
- 164-178 Gradual matching with affirmative action
by Manocha, Kriti & Turhan, Bertan
- 179-208 Pricing and information acquisition in networks
by Xiong, Yifan & Li, Guopeng & Lang, Youze
- 209-232 Measuring tastes for equity and aggregate wealth behind the veil of ignorance
by Heufer, Jan & Shachat, Jason & Xu, Yan
- 233-253 Watchdog versus yes man: News source and media competition
by Kishishita, Daiki & Sato, Susumu
- 254-267 Working with AI: An analysis for rational integration
by Lagziel, David & Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
- 268-293 From monopoly to competition: When do optimal contests prevail?
by Deng, Xiaotie & Gafni, Yotam & Lavi, Ron & Lin, Tao & Ling, Hongyi
- 294-314 Pay it forward: Theory and experiment
by Chuan, Amanda & Zhang, Hanzhe
- 315-344 Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes
by Kogan, Shimon & Schneider, Florian H. & Weber, Roberto A.
- 345-358 Axiomatic analysis of approval-based scoring rules
by Bardal, Tuva & Endriss, Ulle
- 359-385 Dual communication in a social network: Contributing and dedicating attention
by Demange, Gabrielle
- 386-407 A game-theoretic model of misinformation spread on social networks
by Hsu, Chin-Chia & Ajorlou, Amir & Jadbabaie, Ali
- 408-429 Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making
by Clyde, Alexander
- 430-430 Corrigendum to “School choice with costly information Acquisition” [Games and Economic Behavior Volume 143 (2024) 248-268]
by Maxey, Tyler
- 431-450 Advisors with hidden motives
by Onuchic, Paula
- 451-473 Social learning among opinion leaders
by Song, Yangbo
- 474-498 Maxmin, coalitions and evolution
by Newton, Jonathan & Naono, Miharu
- 499-522 Legislative bargaining with private information: A comparison of majority and unanimity rule
by Piazolo, David & Vanberg, Christoph
- 523-540 Policy gambles and valence in elections
by Bils, Peter & Izzo, Federica
- 541-553 Minimal stable voting rules
by Hermida-Rivera, Héctor
- 554-568 Robust group manipulation with indifferences
by Kivinen, Steven
- 569-585 Propaganda and conflict
by Sekeris, Petros G.
- 586-621 Incentivizing variety in innovation contests with specialized suppliers
by Protopappas, Konstantinos & Rietzke, David
- 622-644 Statistical inference in games: Stability of pure equilibria
by Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R.
- 645-678 Costly waiting in dynamic contests: Theory and experiment
by Song, Jian & Houser, Daniel
- 679-701 Trial plans as a means of price discrimination
by Salamat, Ramtin
2025, Volume 152, Issue C
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