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Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem

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  • Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç
  • Doğan, Emre
  • Kesten, Onur
  • Okulicz, Danisz

Abstract

Judicial systems around the world widely differ in the degree they allow litigants to exercise their right to legal counsel. When litigants are completely free to choose their lawyers and vice versa, blocking pairs between litigants and lawyers must be eliminated leading to stable matchings. In this context, a negative externality arises: a pairing between a stronger lawyer and a litigant conflicts with the interests of the opposing litigant and his lawyer. We show that the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed whenever the case structure is dichotomous and within each class, cases are primarily differentiated by the advantage they give to one of the sides. We characterize conditions under which realized matchings can be rationalized as stable. Stable matchings always lead to negatively assortative lawyer pairings within each class. Agent-optimal stable matchings do not necessarily exist. Stable matchings are always efficient, but may not belong to the core.

Suggested Citation

  • Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç & Doğan, Emre & Kesten, Onur & Okulicz, Danisz, 2025. "Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-22.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:152:y:2025:i:c:p:1-22
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

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