IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v152y2025icp1-22.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem

Author

Listed:
  • Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç
  • Doğan, Emre
  • Kesten, Onur
  • Okulicz, Danisz

Abstract

Judicial systems around the world widely differ in the degree they allow litigants to exercise their right to legal counsel. When litigants are completely free to choose their lawyers and vice versa, blocking pairs between litigants and lawyers must be eliminated leading to stable matchings. In this context, a negative externality arises: a pairing between a stronger lawyer and a litigant conflicts with the interests of the opposing litigant and his lawyer. We show that the existence of a stable matching is guaranteed whenever the case structure is dichotomous and within each class, cases are primarily differentiated by the advantage they give to one of the sides. We characterize conditions under which realized matchings can be rationalized as stable. Stable matchings always lead to negatively assortative lawyer pairings within each class. Agent-optimal stable matchings do not necessarily exist. Stable matchings are always efficient, but may not belong to the core.

Suggested Citation

  • Aköz, Kemal Kıvanç & Doğan, Emre & Kesten, Onur & Okulicz, Danisz, 2025. "Stability as right to counsel of choice: A lawyers' matching problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 1-22.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:152:y:2025:i:c:p:1-22
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825625000442
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Stability; Assortative; Externality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:152:y:2025:i:c:p:1-22. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.