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Rationalizability of One-to-One Matchings with Externalities

Author

Listed:
  • Ayse Mumcu
  • Ismail Saglam

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Rationalizability of One-to-One Matchings with Externalities," Working Papers 0807, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:tob:wpaper:0807
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    File URL: http://ikt.web.etu.edu.tr/RePEc/pdf/0807.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sasaki, Hiroo & Toda, Manabu, 1996. "Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 93-108, July.
    2. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Marriage markets with externalities," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-11, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
    3. Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Characterizing Stable One-to-One Matchings under Interdependent Preferences," Working Papers 0806, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
    4. Ismail Saglam & Ayse Mumcu, 2007. "The core of a housing market with externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(57), pages 1-5.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mumcu, Ayse & Saglam, Ismail, 2010. "Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 154-159, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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