Rationalizability of One-to-One Matchings with Externalities
In this paper, we show that the one-to-one matching model of Mumcu and Saglam (2008) studying stability under interdependent preferences is refutable. We also give a sufficient characterization of the set of matchings that are rationalizable inside the core.
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- Sasaki, Hiroo & Toda, Manabu, 1996. "Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 93-108, July.
- Ismail Saglam & Ayse Mumcu, 2007. "The core of a housing market with externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(57), pages 1-5.
- Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Characterizing Stable One-to-One Matchings under Interdependent Preferences," Working Papers 0806, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Marriage markets with externalities," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-11, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
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