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International Journal of Game Theory
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ISSN: 1432-1270
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May 2017, Volume 46, Issue 2
- 295-310 Scarcity, competition, and value
by André Casajus & Harald Wiese - 311-326 Characterizations of perfect recall
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger - 327-355 Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
by Karl Jandoc & Ruben Juarez - 357-381 Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition
by Dimitrios Xefteris & Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton - 383-433 A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts
by Jian Yang - 435-455 Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities
by Mehmet Karakaya & Bettina Klaus - 457-473 Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality
by Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses - 475-486 On the equivalence of quantity competition and supply function competition with sunk costs
by Michał Król - 487-509 Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems
by Jaeok Park - 511-523 Strategic risk and response time across games
by Pablo Brañas-Garza & Debrah Meloso & Luis Miller - 525-545 An axiomatic characterization of the Owen–Shapley spatial power index
by Hans Peters & José M. Zarzuelo - 547-561 P-positions in modular extensions to Nim
by Tanya Khovanova & Karan Sarkar - 563-582 On the drawbacks of large committees
by Volker Hahn - 583-589 The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
by Jonathan Newton - 591-594 Erratum to: A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium
by Joseph Y. Halpern
March 2017, Volume 46, Issue 1
- 263-293 A nested family of $$\varvec{k}$$ k -total effective rewards for positional games
by Endre Boros & Khaled Elbassioni & Vladimir Gurvich & Kazuhisa Makino
November 2016, Volume 45, Issue 4
- 769-793 Existence of equilibria in constrained discontinuous games
by Adib Bagh - 795-816 Differential games with asymmetric information and without Isaacs’ condition
by Rainer Buckdahn & Marc Quincampoix & Catherine Rainer & Yuhong Xu - 817-838 Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
by Dominik Karos - 839-857 Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
by Ori Haimanko & Atsushi Kajii - 859-873 Building Nim
by Eric Duchêne & Matthieu Dufour & Silvia Heubach & Urban Larsson - 875-892 Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems
by Ulrich Faigle & Michel Grabisch - 893-931 Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem
by Kei Kawakami - 933-970 First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules
by Bradley J. Ruffle & Oscar Volij - 971-984 Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games
by Juan I. Block & David K. Levine - 985-1011 Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games
by Maxwell Pak & Bing Xu - 1013-1029 A monotonic core solution for convex TU games
by J. Arin & I. Katsev - 1031-1052 Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids
by Patrick Hummel & R. Preston McAfee & Sergei Vassilvitskii - 1053-1069 Reduced games and egalitarian solutions
by Francesc Llerena & Llúcia Mauri - 1071-1094 AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium
by Giacomo Bonanno - 1095-1109 Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy
by Jiuqiang Liu & Huihui Zhang - 1111-1131 Sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games in terms of forbidden $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 subgames
by Endre Boros & Khaled Elbassioni & Vladimir Gurvich & Kazuhisa Makino & Vladimir Oudalov - 1133-1151 Equilibria and centrality in link formation games
by Hannu Salonen
August 2016, Volume 45, Issue 3
- 497-509 Strategic complementarities, network games and endogenous network formation
by Andreas Lagerås & David Seim - 511-522 The problem of approach in differential–difference games
by Ievgen Liubarshchuk & Ingo Althöfer - 523-542 On refinements of subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium
by János Flesch & Arkadi Predtetchinski - 543-566 On the core and bargaining set of a veto game
by Eric Bahel - 567-583 On discounted AR–AT semi-Markov games and its complementarity formulations
by P. Mondal & S. Sinha & S. K. Neogy & A. K. Das - 585-600 Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games
by R. Pablo Arribillaga - 601-616 Absence-proofness: Group stability beyond the core
by Emre Doğan - 617-625 Grundy values of Fibonacci nim
by Urban Larsson & Simon Rubinstein-Salzedo - 627-653 Dynamic learning and strategic communication
by Maxim Ivanov - 655-674 An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
by Özgün Ekici & Onur Kesten - 675-683 Measurability of the value of a parametrized game
by Karel Prikry & William D. Sudderth - 685-697 Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence
by Haifeng Fu & Ying Xu & Luyi Zhang - 699-708 Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem
by Youngsub Chun & Nari Park & Duygu Yengin - 709-717 Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players
by Shiran Rachmilevitch - 719-729 Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games
by Takuya Iimura & Takahiro Watanabe - 731-742 Misère-play Hackenbush Sprigs
by Neil A. McKay & Rebecca Milley & Richard J. Nowakowski - 743-768 Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
by Marilda Sotomayor
March 2016, Volume 45, Issue 1
- 3-9 Special issue in honor of Abraham Neyman
by Olivier Gossner & Ori Haimanko & Eilon Solan - 11-36 Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
by Françoise Forges & Ulrich Horst & Antoine Salomon - 37-61 Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions
by Sergiu Hart - 63-88 Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
by Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Ram Orzach & Aner Sela - 89-136 Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
by Johannes Hörner & Larry Samuelson - 137-153 Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
by John Hillas & Min Liu - 155-189 Recursive games: uniform value, Tauberian theorem and the Mertens conjecture “ $$Maxmin=\lim v_n=\lim v_{\uplambda }$$ M a x m i n = lim v n = lim v λ ”
by Xiaoxi Li & Xavier Venel - 191-204 The challenge of non-zero-sum stochastic games
by Robert Samuel Simon - 205-237 Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state
by J. Kuipers & J. Flesch & G. Schoenmakers & K. Vrieze - 239-267 Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
by Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi - 269-290 Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints
by Michel Grabisch & Peter Sudhölter - 291-320 Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks
by Panayotis Mertikopoulos & Yannick Viossat - 321-352 Continuous-time limit of dynamic games with incomplete information and a more informed player
by Fabien Gensbittel - 353-374 General limit value in zero-sum stochastic games
by Bruno Ziliotto - 375-387 On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information
by Dov Samet - 389-410 Operator approach to values of stochastic games with varying stage duration
by Sylvain Sorin & Guillaume Vigeral - 411-433 Values of vector measure market games and their representations
by Omer Edhan - 435-459 Projections and functions of Nash equilibria
by Yehuda John Levy - 461-496 The complexity of interacting automata
by Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz
November 2015, Volume 44, Issue 4
- 785-813 Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
by Federico Quartieri & Ryusuke Shinohara - 815-833 Dynamic multilateral markets
by Arnold Polanski & Emiliya Lazarova - 835-868 Characterization of monotonic rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems
by Gustavo Bergantiños & Juan Vidal-Puga - 869-890 On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games
by Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean - 891-902 Axioms of invariance for TU-games
by Sylvain Béal & Eric Rémila & Philippe Solal - 903-932 Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
by Heinrich Nax & Bary Pradelski - 933-948 A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
by Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan - 949-991 Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price”
by Kalyan Chatterjee & Kaustav Das - 993-1013 Pillage games with multiple stable sets
by Simon MacKenzie & Manfred Kerber & Colin Rowat - 1015-1032 Information, interaction and memory
by V. Masson - 1033-1048 Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations
by Tadashi Sekiguchi - 1049-1049 Erratum to: Voting power and proportional representation of voters
by Artyom Jelnov & Yair Tauman
August 2015, Volume 44, Issue 3
- 515-541 Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games
by Igal Milchtaich - 543-569 Incentive compatible market design with applications
by M. Yenmez - 571-597 All-pay 2 $$\times $$ × 2 Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities
by Dan Kovenock & Sudipta Sarangi & Matt Wiser - 599-629 Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines
by Sjaak Hurkens & Nir Vulkan - 631-645 On restricted bargaining sets
by Javier Hervés-Estévez & Emma Moreno-García - 647-666 Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs
by Ron Holzman & Dov Monderer - 667-699 Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning
by Georgios Chasparis & Jeff Shamma & Anders Rantzer - 701-732 Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games
by Sergio Currarini & Francesco Feri - 733-760 Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
by Stéphane Gonzalez & Michel Grabisch - 761-767 On the number of positions in chess without promotion
by Stefan Steinerberger - 769-784 An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
by A. Talman & Zaifu Yang
May 2015, Volume 44, Issue 2
- 253-274 Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint
by Gagan Ghosh - 275-293 Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
by Koji Yokote - 295-319 Roughly weighted hierarchical simple games
by Ali Hameed & Arkadii Slinko - 321-346 Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
by Cy Maor & Eilon Solan - 347-365 Search games on a network with travelling and search costs
by Vic Baston & Kensaku Kikuta - 367-376 Core deviation minimizing auctions
by Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektaş - 377-386 The conic property for vector measure market games
by Omer Edhan - 387-424 Contests with endogenous entry
by Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu - 425-431 A preference change or a perception change? A comment on Dietrich and List
by Marek Hudík - 433-448 Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games
by Boyu Zhang & Josef Hofbauer - 449-471 On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
by René Brink & René Levínský & Miroslav Zelený - 473-486 Stable sets in majority pillage games
by J.S. Jordan & David Obadia - 487-498 A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set
by Sergei Pechersky - 499-514 Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise
by Katsuhiko Aiba
February 2015, Volume 44, Issue 1
- 1-15 An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets
by Francesc Llerena & Marina Núñez & Carles Rafels - 17-36 The emergence of cooperation through leadership
by Shota Fujishima - 37-59 On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability
by Aviad Heifetz & Andrés Perea - 61-81 Prisoners’ other Dilemma
by Matthias Blonski & Giancarlo Spagnolo - 83-112 Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers
by Łukasz Balbus & Kevin Reffett & Łukasz Woźny - 113-133 On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting
by Ido Erev & Sharon Gilat-Yihyie & Davide Marchiori & Doron Sonsino - 135-151 The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players
by Avishay Aiche & Anna Rubinchik & Benyamin Shitovitz - 153-163 Mostly calibrated
by Yossi Feinberg & Nicolas Lambert - 165-193 The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
by Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics - 195-207 Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
by Miki Kato & Shinji Ohseto & Shohei Tamura - 209-223 Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching
by Francis Flanagan - 225-251 The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences
by Nikolai Kukushkin
November 2014, Volume 43, Issue 4
- 721-745 Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation
by Abhimanyu Khan - 747-766 Voting power and proportional representation of voters
by Artyom Jelnov & Yair Tauman - 767-789 Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states
by Fedor Sandomirskiy - 791-819 Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
by Ron Lavi & Ella Segev - 821-843 Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games
by Julio González-Díaz & Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez - 845-870 Linking the Kar and folk solutions through a problem separation property
by Christian Trudeau - 871-879 A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes
by Jesús Getán & Jesús Montes & Carles Rafels - 881-902 Utility proportional beliefs
by Christian Bach & Andrés Perea - 903-924 Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play
by Abhimanyu Khan & Ronald Peeters - 925-943 Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
by Ana Mauleon & Elena Molis & Vincent Vannetelbosch & Wouter Vergote - 945-951 Non-existence of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon
by János Flesch & Jeroen Kuipers & Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi & Gijs Schoenmakers & Eran Shmaya & Eilon Solan & Koos Vrieze - 953-973 The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification
by Akira Okada - 975-990 Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies
by Jiuqiang Liu & Xiaodong Liu - 991-1008 Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
by Zacharias Maniadis
August 2014, Volume 43, Issue 3
- 487-514 Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
by Vlad Mares & Jeroen Swinkels - 515-523 Contests with productive effort
by Ron Siegel - 525-550 A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
by Ronald Stauber - 551-577 A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game
by Daniel Carvalho & Luís Santos-Pinto - 579-597 Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
by Vikram Manjunath - 599-618 False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
by Liad Wagman & Vincent Conitzer - 619-627 The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare
by Anirban Kar & Arunava Sen - 629-658 Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly
by Rabah Amir & Giuseppe Feo - 659-692 On $${\alpha }$$ α -roughly weighted games
by Josep Freixas & Sascha Kurz - 693-719 Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach
by Naoki Kojima
May 2014, Volume 43, Issue 2
- 245-267 Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma
by Kfir Eliaz & Roberto Serrano - 269-281 LIM is not slim
by Alex Fink & Aviezri Fraenkel & Carlos Santos - 283-350 Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
by Igal Milchtaich - 351-368 Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players
by René Brink & Gerard Laan & Valeri Vasil’ev - 369-393 Ranking asymmetric auctions
by Arieh Gavious & Yizhaq Minchuk - 395-402 On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
by Carlos Pimienta & Jianfei Shen - 403-413 Monotonic models and cycles
by José Rodrigues-Neto - 415-438 The combinatorial game theory of well-tempered scoring games
by Will Johnson - 439-454 The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
by Eun Heo - 455-485 Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games
by Antonio Jiménez-Martínez
February 2014, Volume 43, Issue 1
- 1-11 Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value
by André Casajus - 13-24 How long to Pareto efficiency?
by Yakov Babichenko - 25-36 When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
by Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper - 37-63 On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games
by Jean Derks & Hans Peters & Peter Sudhölter - 65-88 Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox”
by M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro’i Zultan - 89-135 Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games
by Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi - 137-143 Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory
by Daniel Monte - 145-151 A savings paradox for integer-valued gambling strategies
by Jason Teutsch - 153-168 A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
by Kentaro Hatsumi & Dolors Berga & Shigehiro Serizawa - 169-192 Poor convexity and Nash equilibria in games
by Tadeusz Radzik - 193-213 Countable spaces and common priors
by Ziv Hellman - 215-244 Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
by Cuihong Fan & Byoung Jun & Elmar Wolfstetter
November 2013, Volume 42, Issue 4
- 777-788 Algorithms for lattice games
by Alan Guo & Ezra Miller - 789-800 Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
by Ro’i Zultan - 801-833 Non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games
by Marcin Dziubiński - 835-844 Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs
by Julio González-Díaz & Ron Siegel - 845-865 Picking the winners
by Pablo Amorós - 867-890 Correlation through bounded recall strategies
by Ron Peretz - 891-915 A polynomial algorithm for a two parameter extension of Wythoff NIM based on the Perron–Frobenius theory
by Endre Boros & Vladimir Gurvich & Vladimir Oudalov - 917-929 Optimal strategies for a game on amenable semigroups
by Valerio Capraro & Kent Morrison - 931-946 Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
by Inbar Aricha & Rann Smorodinsky - 947-972 Values of nondifferentiable vector measure games
by Omer Edhan - 973-988 Stochastic bankruptcy games
by Helga Habis & P. Herings - 989-1020 Value function of differential games without Isaacs conditions. An approach with nonanticipative mixed strategies
by Rainer Buckdahn & Juan Li & Marc Quincampoix - 1021-1040 Analysis of stochastic matching markets
by Péter Biró & Gethin Norman - 1041-1057 Imitation, local interaction, and coordination
by Hsiao-Chi Chen & Yunshyong Chow & Li-Chau Wu - 1059-1083 On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games
by Paul Goldberg & Rahul Savani & Troels Sørensen & Carmine Ventre - 1085-1096 Representation of finite games as network congestion games
by Igal Milchtaich
August 2013, Volume 42, Issue 3
- 563-566 Introduction to the special issue
by Giacomo Bonanno & Andreas Herzig & Wiebe Hoek & Jérôme Lang - 567-592 AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties
by Giacomo Bonanno - 593-611 Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium
by Hubie Chen - 613-637 Where do preferences come from?
by Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 639-671 Program equilibrium—a program reasoning approach
by Wiebe Hoek & Cees Witteveen & Michael Wooldridge - 673-694 Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership
by Michel Le Breton & Juan Moreno-Ternero & Alexei Savvateev & Shlomo Weber - 695-723 Wisdom of crowds versus groupthink: learning in groups and in isolation
by Conor Mayo-Wilson & Kevin Zollman & David Danks - 725-753 Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility
by Burkhard Schipper - 755-776 Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces
by Michael Trost
May 2013, Volume 42, Issue 2
- 325-337 Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem
by J. Arin - 339-355 On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game
by Yan-An Hwang - 357-373 On membership and marginal values
by Norman Kleinberg & Jeffrey Weiss - 375-398 Farsighted free trade networks
by Jin Zhang & Licun Xue & Lei Zu - 399-410 Almost common priors
by Ziv Hellman - 411-437 On Dedekind’s problem for complete simple games
by Sascha Kurz & Nikolas Tautenhahn - 439-460 A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
by Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau - 461-482 Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property
by Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring - 483-499 Contractually stable networks
by Jean-François Caulier & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch - 501-520 Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer–counteroffer mechanism with two players
by Yuan Ju - 521-539 One-to-many non-cooperative matching games
by Yujiro Kawasaki