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Vijay Krishna

Personal Details

First Name:Vijay
Middle Name:
Last Name:Krishna
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pkr252
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/vjkrishna/
Terminal Degree:1983 Department of Economics; Princeton University (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Pennsylvania State University

State College, Pennsylvania (United States)
http://econ.la.psu.edu/
RePEc:edi:depsuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters Books Editorship

Working papers

  1. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2010. "Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 814577000000000498, www.najecon.org.
  2. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2008. "On the Benefits of Costly Voting," Economics Working Papers 0083, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  3. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt4010c6w9, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Vijay Krishna, 2002. "Eliciting Information from an Expert: The Art of Conversation (joint with John Morgan)," Theory workshop papers 357966000000000092, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics.
  6. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information 9805001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jul 1999.
  7. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Apr 1998.
  8. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1996. "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Game Theory and Information 9601001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Vijay Krishna & Tomas Sjostrom, 1995. "On the Convergence of Fictitious Play," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1717, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Krishna, V. & Rosenthal, R.W., 1995. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Papers 04-95-06, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  11. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Krishna, V. & serrano, R., 1993. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," Papers 10-93-31, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  13. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1991. "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 91-34, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

Articles

  1. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2021. "Startups and Upstarts: Disadvantageous Information in R&D," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(2), pages 534-569.
  2. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2020. "Information exchange in cartels," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 421-446, June.
  3. Awaya, Yu & Krishna, Vijay, 2019. "Communication and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
  4. Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
  5. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2015. "Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 339-375, November.
  6. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2012. "Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2083-2123.
  7. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2011. "Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(2), pages 183-211.
  8. Hafalir, Isa & Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Revenue and efficiency effects of resale in first-price auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 589-602, September.
  9. Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 87-112, March.
  10. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2008. "Contracting for information under imperfect commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 905-925, December.
  11. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
  12. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
  13. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775.
  14. Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 2001. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179.
  15. Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-1119, July.
  16. Krishna, Vijay, 2001. "Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(2), pages 435-452, June.
  17. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
  18. Krishna, Vijay & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1996. "Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-31, November.
  19. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
  20. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(3), pages 259-272.
  21. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1993. "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 303-323, March.
  22. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1991. "Entry deterrence and dynamic competition : The role of capacity reconsidered," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 477-495, December.
  23. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1987. "Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(1), pages 23-35.
  24. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
    RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:479-511 is not listed on IDEAS

Chapters

  1. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Vijay Krishna on Hugo F. Sonnenschein," Springer Books, in: Matthew O. Jackson & Andrew McLennan (ed.), Foundations in Microeconomic Theory, chapter 10, pages 193-212, Springer.

Books

  1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.

Editorship

  1. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  3. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  6. Number of Citations
  7. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  8. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  9. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  10. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  18. h-index
  19. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  20. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  21. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  22. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  23. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  24. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  25. Euclidian citation score
  26. Breadth of citations across fields
  27. Wu-Index
  28. Record of graduates

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 1998-10-02 1999-02-15 2005-04-16
  2. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 1998-10-02 1999-02-15
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2010-10-09
  4. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2010-10-09

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