On the Convergence of Ficticious Play
We study the continuous time Brown-Robinson fictitious play process f or non-zero sum games. We show that, in general, fictitious play cannot converg e cyclically to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both players use more tha n two pure strategies.
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|Date of creation:||1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY PARK PENNSYLVANIA 16802 U.S.A.|
Web page: http://econ.la.psu.edu/
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- Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997. "Belief Affirming in Learning Processes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 438-452, April.