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A general model of best response adaptation

  • Ulrich Berger

    (Vienna University of Economics)

We develop a general model of best response adaptation in large populations for symmetric and asymmetric conflicts with role-switching. For special cases including the classical best response dynamics and the symmetrized best response dynamics we show that the set of Nash equilibria is attracting for zero-sum games. For asymmetric conflicts and equally large populations, convergence to a Nash equilibrium in the base game implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium on the Wright manifold in the role game.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0303008.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 25 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0303008
Note: Type of Document - pdf-file; pages: 21; figures: included
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  1. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Evolution and Mixed Strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 200-226, February.
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  9. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  10. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  11. Cressman, R., 2000. "Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 183-205, August.
  12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  13. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  14. Ulrich Berger, 2002. "Best response dynamics for role games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 527-538.
  15. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  16. Ulrich Berger, 2003. "Continuous Fictitious Play via Projective Geometry," Game Theory and Information 0303004, EconWPA.
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