Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
We present a class of games with a pure strategy being strictly dominated by another pure strategy such that the former survives along most solutions of the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics.
|Date of creation:||01 Sep 2004|
|Date of revision:||09 Sep 2004|
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