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Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

In (Viossat, 2006, "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria", forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take part in any correlated equilibrium remain. Here, we generalize this result by showing that it holds for an open set of games, and for many other dynamics, including the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.

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File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0629.pdf
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Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 629.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 15 May 2006
Date of revision: 21 Jun 2006
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0629
Note: The first version was called "Evolutionary dynamics do no lead to correlated equilibria"
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  1. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May.
  2. Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 629, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2006.
  3. Dan Friedman, 2010. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 392, David K. Levine.
  4. Ulrich Berger & Josef Hofbauer, 2004. "Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics," Game Theory and Information 0409002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 2004.
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  9. Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Is Having a Unique Equilibrium Robust?," Post-Print hal-00361891, HAL.
  10. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
  11. Yannick Viossat, 2007. "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria," Post-Print hal-00664293, HAL.
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  15. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1991. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Discussion Papers 1001, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  17. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
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  19. Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1997. "Fictitious play and- no-cycling conditions," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-12, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  20. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
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  22. repec:dau:papers:123456789/387 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  24. Young, H. Peyton, 2004. "Strategic Learning and its Limits," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199269181, December.
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  26. Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
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