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Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games

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  • J. Swinkels

Abstract

When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models of experimentation and adjustment, and some simple learning dynamics. We present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens [1986]). This behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs.
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Suggested Citation

  • J. Swinkels, 2010. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 456, David K. Levine.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:456
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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