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On Adaptative Learning in Strategic Games

  • Marimon, R.
  • McGraltan, E.

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Paper provided by Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals in its series Papers with number 190.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:cambri:190
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, RESEARCH PROJECT ON RISK, INFORMATION AND QUANTITY SIGNALS IN ECONOMICS(E.S.R.C.), DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED ECONOMICS, SIDGWICK AV. CAMBRIDGE CB3 9DEDE U.K..
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/
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  1. Van Damme, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in 2 x 2 Games," Papers 9108, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  2. Marimon, Ramon & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1073-107, September.
  3. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel, 2010. "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 432, David K. Levine.
  5. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
  6. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
  7. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-43, August.
  8. Gilboa Itzhak & Schmeidler David, 1994. "Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 370-399, May.
  9. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
  10. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1991. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 981, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March.
  12. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1994. "Weak and strong merging of opinions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 73-86, January.
  13. David Canning, 1989. "Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 190, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  14. repec:att:wimass:9122 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Jordan, J S, 1992. "Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 109-23, January.
  16. Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August.
  17. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Samuelson, L., 1989. "Evolutionnary Stability In Asymmetric Games," Papers 11-8-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  19. J. Swinkels, 2010. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 456, David K. Levine.
  20. Friedman, James W., 1983. "Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 37-53.
  21. Ramon Marimon & Stephen E. Spear & Shyam Sunder, 1993. "Expectationally-driven market volatility: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 21, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  22. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 649-70, May.
  23. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 885-910, August.
  24. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  25. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  26. M. Kandori & R. Rob, 2010. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 502, David K. Levine.
  27. Nyarko, Y., 1992. "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers 92-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  28. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  29. Tom Ross & Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe, 1987. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 87-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  30. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
  31. Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet, 1991. "Absorbent Stable Sets," Discussion Papers 935, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  32. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  33. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  34. Marimon, Ramon & McGrattan, Ellen & Sargent, Thomas J., 1990. "Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 329-373, May.
  35. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  36. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  37. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August.
  38. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
  39. Samuelson, Larry, 1991. "Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 110-128, February.
  40. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
  41. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521456821 is not listed on IDEAS
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