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On Adaptative Learning in Strategic Games

Listed author(s):
  • Marimon, R.
  • McGraltan, E.

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Paper provided by Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals in its series Papers with number 190.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Handle: RePEc:fth:cambri:190
Contact details of provider: Postal:
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, RESEARCH PROJECT ON RISK, INFORMATION AND QUANTITY SIGNALS IN ECONOMICS(E.S.R.C.), DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED ECONOMICS, SIDGWICK AV. CAMBRIDGE CB3 9DEDE U.K..

Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/
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  1. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
  2. Allison, G. & Fudenberg, D., 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Working papers 92-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Tom Ross & Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe, 1987. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 87-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  4. Swinkels, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants," Papers 9, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
  5. Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1991. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Discussion Papers 1001, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-1240, September.
  7. Samuelson, L., 1991. "How to Tremble if you Must," Working papers 9122, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  8. Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  9. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
  10. Ramon Marimon & Stephen E. Spear & Shyam Sunder, 1993. "Expectationally-driven market volatility: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 21, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  11. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August.
  12. Marimon, Ramon & McGrattan, Ellen & Sargent, Thomas J., 1990. "Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 329-373, May.
  13. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 649-670, May.
  14. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
  15. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  16. M. Kandori & R. Rob, 2010. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 502, David K. Levine.
  17. Friedman, James W., 1983. "Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 37-53.
  18. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  19. Van Damme, E., 1991. "Equilibrium Selection in 2 x 2 Games," Papers 9108, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  20. D. Fudenberg & C. Harris, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 496, David K. Levine.
  21. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1994. "Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-00481357, HAL.
  22. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, "undated". "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  23. David Canning, 1989. "Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 190, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  24. Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet, 1991. "Absorbent Stable Sets," Discussion Papers 935, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  26. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  27. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1994. "Weak and strong merging of opinions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 73-86, January.
  28. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
  29. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
  30. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  31. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  32. Ramon Marimon & Shyam Sunder, 1993. "Indeterminacy of equilibria in a hyperinflationary world: Experimental evidence," Economics Working Papers 25, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  33. J. S. Jordan, 1992. "Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 109-123.
  34. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
  35. Nyarko, Y., 1992. "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers 92-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  36. Cabrales, Antonio & Sobel, Joel, 1992. "On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 407-419, August.
  37. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  38. Samuelson, Larry, 1991. "Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 110-128, February.
  39. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  40. John B. Van Huyck & Raymond C. Battalio & Richard O. Beil, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 885-910.
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