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Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications

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  • Jonathan Bendor
  • Piotr Swistak

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  • Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak, 1998. "Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 99-159, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:45:y:1998:i:2:p:99-159 DOI: 10.1023/A:1005083323183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B. & Pollock, Gregory B. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1991. "Viscous population equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 101-109, February.
    2. Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-1071, September.
    3. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
    4. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    5. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    6. Cabrales, Antonio & Sobel, Joel, 1992. "On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 407-419, August.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:91:y:1997:i:02:p:290-307_20 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February.
    9. Blume Andreas, 1994. "Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 66-77.
    10. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1990. "Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-117, June.
    11. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9410002, EconWPA.
    12. Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 485-507, June.
    13. repec:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:02:p:418-431_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    15. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
    16. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
    17. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    18. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
    19. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August.
    20. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312.
    21. Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August.
    22. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    23. Jonathan Bendor, 1993. "Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 709-734, December.
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    25. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-867, May.
    26. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 306-332.
    27. Warneryd Karl, 1993. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 532-546, October.
    28. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
    29. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1994. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Game Theory and Information 9410002, EconWPA.
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    33. Per Molander, 1985. "The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 29(4), pages 611-618, December.
    34. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    35. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
    36. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jörg Rieskamp & Peter Todd, 2006. "The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies for Asymmetric Social Interactions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 69-111, February.
    2. Matthijs van Veelen, 2007. "Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-115/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Müller, Stephan & von Wangenheim, Georg, 2014. "Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas: Signaling internalized norms," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 221, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    4. Müller, Stephan & von Wangenheim, Georg, 2016. "Coevolution of cooperation, preferences, and cooperative signals in social dilemmas," Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers 221 [rev.], University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    5. Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2012. "In and out of Equilibrium II: Evolution in Repeated Games with Discounting and Complexity Costs," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-089/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Matthijs van Veelen & Julian Garcia, 2010. "In and Out of Equilibrium: Evolution of Strategies in Repeated Games with Discounting," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-037/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Müller, Stephan & von Wangenheim, Georg, 2016. "Coevolution of Cooperation, Preferences and Cooperative Signals in Social Dilemmas," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145713, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.

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