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Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results

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  • Banerjee, Abhijit

    (Harvard University)

  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    (Stockholm University)

Abstract

A large part of economics, and economic theory in particular, relies on such solution concepts as Nash equilibrium and its refinements. Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide a solid theoretical or empirical justification for Nash equilibrium behaviour. ‘Rationality’, or even ‘common knowledge of rationality’, is not enough to generate such behaviour. Among other things, one also needs to assume that the players coordinate their beliefs about each other’s actions (Armbruster and Boege, 1979; Johansen, 1982; Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984; Bernheim, 1986; Binmore, 1987; Aumann, 1987; Tan and Werlang, 1988; Aumann and Brandenburger, 1991). Moreover, in games with a dynamic structure, the very notion of rationality becomes problematic, and common knowledge of rationality may even lead to logical contradictions (Rosenthal, 1981; Binmore, 1987; Bicchieri, 1989; Basu, 1988, 1990).
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results," Working Paper Series 345, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0345
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cooter, Robert D., 1998. "Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for the "Bad Man" of Holmes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt5dj8m2kf, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993. "The 'As if' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4 Obstacles," Working Paper Series 392, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    3. Cooter, Robert D., 1999. "Punitive Damages, Social Norms, and Economic Analysis," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt7h38w307, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    4. Banerjee, A. & Weibull, J.W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1637, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary game theory; Rationality; Nash equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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