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Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results

  • Banerjee, Abhijit

    (Harvard University)

  • Weibull, Jörgen W.

    (Stockholm University)

No abstract is available for this item.

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Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 345.

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Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0345
Contact details of provider: Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
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  1. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 1992. "The Evolutionary Foundations of Backward and Forward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 216, University of Bonn, Germany.
  3. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. " Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environme nts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(3), pages 473-88.
  4. Johansen, Leif, 1982. " On the Status of the Nash Type of Noncooperative Equilibrium in Economic Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(3), pages 421-41.
  5. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
  6. Cabrales, Antonio & Sobel, Joel, 1992. "On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 407-419, August.
  7. Winter, Sidney G, 1971. "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 85(2), pages 237-61, May.
  8. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
  10. Basu, Kaushik, 1988. "Strategic irrationality in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 247-260, June.
  11. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May.
  12. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa & Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy, 1987. "The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 111, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  13. Basu, Kaushik, 1990. "On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 33-44.
  14. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August.
  15. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  16. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  17. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
  18. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
  19. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  20. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  21. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February.
  22. Sidney G. Winter, 1964. "Economic "Natural Selection" and the Theory of the Firm," LEM Chapters Series, in: Yale Economic Essays, pages 225-272 Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
  23. Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  24. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  25. David Canning, 1989. "Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 190, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
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