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Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria

  • Yannick Viossat

    ()

    (CEREMADE - CEntre de REcherches en MAthématiques de la DEcision - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Université Paris IX - Paris Dauphine)

We show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.

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Date of creation: Jul 2008
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Publication status: Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2008, 56 (1), pp.27-43. <10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001>
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00360756
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00360756
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