Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces that are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and the authors show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria and, hence, a strategically stable set in the sense of E. Kohlberg and J. F. Mertens (1986). Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
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- Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
- Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa & Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy, 1987.
"The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,"
Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)
111, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
- Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
- Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
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