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Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games

  • Bill Sandholm
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    File URL: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~whs/research/pdsg.pdf
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    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Theory workshop papers with number 505798000000000042.

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    Date of creation: 03 Apr 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:uclatw:505798000000000042
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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    1. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
    2. Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-67, May.
    3. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Game Theory and Information 9904001, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000.
    4. J. Swinkels, 2010. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 456, David K. Levine.
    5. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
    6. Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-60, May.
    7. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    8. Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    9. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
    10. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    11. Benaim, Michel & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2000. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Working Paper Series 534, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 30 Oct 2001.
    12. Sandholm, William H., 2003. "Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 343-378, August.
    13. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1995. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9529, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    14. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    15. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
    16. Gaunersdorfer Andrea & Hofbauer Josef, 1995. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 279-303, November.
    17. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 20, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    18. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
    19. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
    20. William H. Sandholm, 2002. "Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 667-689.
    21. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
    22. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
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