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Evolution with diverse preferences

  • Ely,J.C.
  • Sandholm,W.H.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/research/math/JeffEly/working/dp.pdf
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Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 5.

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Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20005
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Lawrence Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Game Theory and Information 9607001, EconWPA.
  2. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
  3. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
  4. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  5. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  6. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  7. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
  8. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January.
  9. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Yilankaya, Okan, 2001. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 255-272, April.
  10. Swinkels, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants," Papers 9, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
  11. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Evolution and Mixed Strategies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 200-226, February.
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