Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria
better understand when mixed equilibria might arise within populations of interact acting agents, we examine a model of smoothed fictitious play that is designed to capture Harsanyi's "Purification", view of mixed equilibria in a setting with a large population of agents. Our analysis concerns the local stability of equilibria when the degree of heterogeneity in the population is small. In 2 x 2 games our model is easy to analyze and yields the same conclusions as have previous models. Our primary focus is on 3 x 3 games where we provide a general characterization of which equilibria are locally stable, and discuss its implications in several particular cases. Among our conclusions are that learning can sometimes provide a justification for mixed equilibria outside of 2 x 2 games, that whether an equilibrium is stable or unstable is often dependent on the distribution of payoff heterogeneity in the population, that the totally mixed equilibria of zero sum games are generically stable, and that under a "balanced perturbation" condition the equilibria of symmetric games are generically unstable.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010.
"Learning Mixed Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
415, David K. Levine.
- Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July.
- Ed Hopkins, 1997.
"A Note on Best Response Dynamics,"
ESE Discussion Papers
3, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1999.
"Conditional Universal Consistency,"
3204826, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995.
"Consistency and cautious fictitious play,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of Normal Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 444-469, August.
- Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
- Benaim, Michel & Hirsch, Morris W., 1999. "Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Fictitious Play in Perturbed Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 36-72, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:90:y:2000:i:1:p:84-115. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.