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Conditional Universal Consistency

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  • Fudenberg, Drew
  • Levine, David K.

Abstract

Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally consistent:†they yield almost as high a time-average payoff as if the player knew the conditional distributions of actions given categories. Moreover, given any alternative procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor. We also discuss cycles, and argue that the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium.
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Suggested Citation

  • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:104-130
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    References listed on IDEAS

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