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Conditional Universal Consistency

  • Fudenberg, Drew
  • Levine, David K.

Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally consistent:†they yield almost as high a time-average payoff as if the player knew the conditional distributions of actions given categories. Moreover, given any alternative procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor. We also discuss cycles, and argue that the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 29 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
Pages: 104-130

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:104-130
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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1999. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," Scholarly Articles 3203773, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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  15. T.H. Chung, 2010. "Approximate Methods for Sequential Decision Making Using Expert Advice," Levine's Working Paper Archive 564, David K. Levine.
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