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Economists' Models of Learning

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  • Sobel, Joel

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  • Sobel, Joel, 2000. "Economists' Models of Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 241-261, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:94:y:2000:i:2:p:241-261
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    9. Gale, Douglas & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1999. "Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-40.
    10. Cabrales, Antonio & Sobel, Joel, 1992. "On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 407-419, August.
    11. Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 943-956.
    12. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
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    14. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125.
    15. Blume Andreas & Kim Yong-Gwan & Sobel Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 547-575, October.
    16. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
    17. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
    18. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
    19. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
    20. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
    21. Gale, Douglas, 1996. "What have we learned from social learning?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 617-628, April.
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    28. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    29. Dekel, Eddie & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1992. "On the evolution of optimizing behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 392-406, August.
    30. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    31. Cabrales, Antonio, 1999. "Adaptive Dynamics and the Implementation Problem with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 159-184.
    32. Gul, Faruk, 1996. "Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-31, July.
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    34. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October.
    35. Dennis E. Smallwood & John Conlisk, 1979. "Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 1-23.
    36. Monderer, Dov & Sela, Aner, 1996. "A2 x 2Game without the Fictitious Play Property," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 144-148, May.
    37. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 1999. "Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 294-309, August.
    38. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco D'Errico & Gulnur Muradoglu & Silvana Stefani & Giovanni Zambruno, 2014. "Opinion Dynamics and Price Formation: a Nonlinear Network Model," Papers 1408.0308, arXiv.org.
    2. Satake, Akiko & Janssen, Marco A. & Levin, Simon A. & Iwasa, Yoh, 2007. "Synchronized deforestation induced by social learning under uncertainty of forest-use value," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2-3), pages 452-462, August.
    3. Matthew O. Jackson & Benjamin Golub, 2007. "Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds," Working Papers 2007.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2012. "Models of Adaptive Learning in Game Theory," Chapters,in: Handbook of Knowledge and Economics, chapter 11 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Brock,W.A. & Hommes,C.H., 2001. "Evolutionary dynamics in financial markets with many trader types," Working papers 7, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    6. Gomes, Orlando, 2009. "Stability under learning: The endogenous growth problem," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, pages 807-816.
    7. Brock, William A. & Hommes, Cars H. & Wagener, Florian O. O., 2005. "Evolutionary dynamics in markets with many trader types," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, pages 7-42.
    8. repec:eee:ecomod:v:229:y:2012:i:c:p:16-24 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Daniel F. Heuermann, 2009. "Career Networks and Job Matching - Evidence on the Microeconomic Foundations of Human Capital Externalities," IAAEG Discussion Papers until 2011 200901, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    10. László Kóczy & Alexandru Nichifor, 2013. "The intellectual influence of economic journals: quality versus quantity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 863-884, April.
    11. Marco Sahm & Robert K. von Weizsäcker, 2014. "Reason, Intuition, and Time," CESifo Working Paper Series 5134, CESifo Group Munich.

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