Naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play in games

Compared with more sophisticated equilibrium theory, naive, non-equilibrium behavioral rules often better describe individuals’ initial play in games. In addition, in repeated play in games, when individuals have the opportunity to learn about their opponents’ past behavior, learning models of different sophistication levels are successful in explaining how individuals modify their behavior in response to the provided information. How do subjects who follow different behavioral rules in initial play modify their behavior after they learn about past behavior? This study links initial and repeated play in two different types of games (11–20 and 3 × 3 normal-form games) using a within-subject laboratory design. We classify individuals as following different behavioral rules in initial and repeated play and test whether and/or how strategic naivete and sophistication in initial play correlate with naivete and sophistication in repeated play. We find no evidence of a positive correlation between naivete and sophistication in initial and repeated play.