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Subjective Games and Equilibria

Author

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  • Kalai, Ehud
  • Lehrer, Ehud

Abstract

Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Nash and correlated equilibria, replace unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing such a game repeatedly, subjective optimizers will converge to a subjective equilibrium. We apply this approach to some well known examples including a single multi-arm bandit player, multi-person mulit-arm bandit games, and repeated Cournot oligopoly games.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Games and Equilibria," Working Papers 875, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:875
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    File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp-old.pdf
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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C83 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods

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