A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades
An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual with regard to his own information. The authors argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.
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- Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August.
- Conlisk, John, 1980. "Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991. "Custom Versus Fashion: Hysteresis and Limit Cycles in a Random Matching Game," Discussion Papers 940, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Friedman, Daniel & Aoki, Masanao, 1992. "Inefficient Information Aggregation as a," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 251-79, October.
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