Custom Versus Fashion: Hysteresis and Limit Cycles in a Random Matching Game
This paper considers a simple pairwise random matching game in the society populated by two groups of agents: Conformists and Nonconformists. Depending on the relative frequencies of intergroup and intragroup matchings, the best response dynamics show three types of asymptotic behaviors: global convergence, hysteresis and limit cycles. In the hysteresis case, Conformists set the social custom, and Nonconformists revolt against it; what action becomes the custom is determined by "history." In the limit cycle case, Nonconformists become fashion leaders and switch their actions periodically, while Conformists follow with delay.
|Date of creation:||Jun 1991|
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