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On adaptive learning in strategic games

  • Ramon Marimon
  • Ellen McGrattan

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File URL: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/24.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 24.

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Date of creation: Mar 1993
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:24
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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  1. van Damme, E.E.C., 1991. "Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 games," Other publications TiSEM 1c09a228-43e3-48ec-ad9c-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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  3. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1994. "Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-00481357, HAL.
  4. John B. Van Huyck & Raymond C. Battalio & Richard O. Beil, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 885-910.
  5. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 649-70, May.
  6. Swinkels Jeroen M., 1993. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 455-484, July.
  7. Ramon Marimon & Stephen E. Spear & Shyam Sunder, 1992. "Expectationally-driven market volatility: an experimental study," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 73, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Samuelson, Larry, 1991. "Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 110-128, February.
  9. Itzhak Gilboa & Akihiko Matsui, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Post-Print hal-00753235, HAL.
  10. E. Kalai & E. Lehrer, 2010. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 529, David K. Levine.
  11. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolution and strategic stability: From maynard smith to kohlberg and mertens," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 333-342, August.
  13. M. Kandori & R. Rob, 2010. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Levine's Working Paper Archive 502, David K. Levine.
  14. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  15. Friedman, James W., 1983. "Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 37-53.
  16. J. S. Jordan, 1992. "Convergence to Rational Expectations in a Stationary Linear Game," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 109-123.
  17. Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel, 2010. "On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 432, David K. Levine.
  18. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August.
  19. Allison, G. & Fudenberg, D., 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Working papers 92-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  20. D. Fudenberg & C. Harris, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 496, David K. Levine.
  21. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
  22. Marimon, Ramon & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1073-107, September.
  23. E. Dekel & S. Scotchmer, 2010. "On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 434, David K. Levine.
  24. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-40, September.
  25. Marimon, Ramon & McGrattan, Ellen & Sargent, Thomas J., 1990. "Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 329-373, May.
  26. John B Van Huyck & Raymond C Battalio & Richard O Beil, 1997. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1225, David K. Levine.
  27. Tom Ross & Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe, 1987. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 87-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  28. KOHLBERG, Elon & MERTENS, Jean-François, . "On the strategic stability of equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 716, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  29. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1992. "Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions," Discussion Papers 983, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. David Canning, 1989. "Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 190, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  31. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  32. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  33. Samuelson, L., 1991. "How to Tremble if you Must," Working papers 9122, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  34. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
  35. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
  36. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  37. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
  38. Itzhak Gilboa & Dov Samet, 1991. "Absorbent Stable Sets," Discussion Papers 935, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  39. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
  40. Nyarko, Y., 1992. "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games Leads to Correlated Equilibria," Working Papers 92-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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