Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
Deductive equilibrium analysis often fails to provide a unique equilibrium solution in many situations of strategic interdependence. Consequently, a theory of equilibrium selection would be a useful complement to the theory of equilibrium points. A salient equilibrium selection principle would allow decision makers to implement a mutual best response outcome. This paper uses the experimental method to examine the salience of payoff-dominance, security, and historical precedents in related average opinion games. The systematic and, hence, predictable behavior observed in the experiments suggests that it should be possible to construct an accurate theory of equilibrium selection.
Volume (Year): 106 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:106:y:1991:i:3:p:885-910.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.