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Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games

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  • Ehud Kalai
  • Dov Samet

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  • Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:515
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-894, July.
    2. Harsanyi, John C., 1982. "Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory, part II : Analysis of specific bargaining games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 259-279, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alioğulları, Zeynel Harun & Barlo, Mehmet, 2012. "Entropic selection of Nash equilibrium," MPRA Paper 37132, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kets, W. & Voorneveld, M., 2005. "Learning to be Prepared," Discussion Paper 2005-117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
    4. Myerson, Roger B., 1989. "Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 264-303, June.
    5. Ramon Marimon & Ellen McGrattan, 1993. "On adaptive learning in strategic games," Economics Working Papers 24, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 2005. "When all is said and done, how should you play and what should you expect ?," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Mark Voorneveld & Willemien Kets & Henk Norde, 2006. "An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(1), pages 153-153, April.
    8. Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2013. "Electing a parliament," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 715-737, March.
    9. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1983. "Unanimity Games and Pareto Optimality," Discussion Papers 546, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    10. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
    11. Chaim Fershtman & Eitan Muller, 1983. "Capital Accumulation and the Sustainability of Collusive Markets," Discussion Papers 566, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Geir B. , Asheim & Voorneveld, Max & W. Weibull, Jörgen, 2009. "Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets," Memorandum 01/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    13. Myerson, R B, 1986. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 133-154.
    14. Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2016. "Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 451, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    15. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1986. "Are Bayesian-Nash Incentives and Implementations Perfect?," Discussion Papers 680, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    16. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample," Working Papers 210, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.
    18. Donald Saari, 1989. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 819, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    19. Possajennikov, Alex, 2001. "Equilibrium selection in a merger game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 255-261, August.

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