IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nwu/cmsems/819.html

Social Stability and Equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Donald Saari

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Saari, 1989. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 819, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:819
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/819.pdf
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert J. Aumann, 2025. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY, chapter 7, pages 175-200, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
    3. Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 1982. "Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games," Discussion Papers 515, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1987. "The conventionally stable sets in noncooperative games with limited observations I: Definitions and introductory arguments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 93-128, April.
    5. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2005. "When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?," Discussion Paper Series dp387, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Marimon, R. & McGraltan, E., 1993. "On Adaptative Learning in Strategic Games," Papers 190, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
    3. Francesco De Sinopoli & Leo Ferraris & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2013. "Electing a parliament," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 715-737, March.
    4. Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
    6. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 2020. "Correction to: Refinements and higher-order beliefs: a unified survey," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 351-351, April.
    7. Balkenborg, Dieter & Hofbauer, Josef & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2016. "Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 451, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    8. Dekel, Eddie & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2015. "Epistemic Game Theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    9. Azrieli, Yaron, 2010. "Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 303-310, May.
    10. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    11. Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1993. "INTROSPECTION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN 2x2 MATRIX GAMES," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    12. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Lippert, Steffen, 2004. "Networks of Relations," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 570, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 04 Jun 2010.
    13. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    14. Dov Samet, 2016. "On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 375-387, March.
    15. Barry O'Neill, 1992. "Deterrence Theory Discussion: II," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(4), pages 459-477, October.
    16. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2004. "A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 41-54, January.
    17. Xiao Luo & Ben Wang, 2022. "An epistemic characterization of MACA," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 995-1024, June.
    18. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Non-Altruistic Equilibria," MPRA Paper 88347, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Geir B. , Asheim & Voorneveld, Max & W. Weibull, Jörgen, 2009. "Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets," Memorandum 01/2010, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    20. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2011. "On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample," Working Papers 210, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2011.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:819. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Fran Walker The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Fran Walker to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cmnwuus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.