IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/5475.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

Author

Listed:
  • Azrieli, Yaron

Abstract

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the distribution of actions of his opponents in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

Suggested Citation

  • Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game," MPRA Paper 5475, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5475
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/5475/1/MPRA_paper_5475.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    2. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    4. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    5. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath & Avner Shaked, 2000. "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 46-72, March.
    8. Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997. "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(3), pages 551-556.
    9. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-573, May.
    10. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "Categorization generated by prototypes -- an axiomatic approach," Game Theory and Information 0405003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
    12. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
    13. Fryer Roland & Jackson Matthew O., 2008. "A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-44, February.
    14. Di Tillio, Alfredo, 2004. "A note on one-shot public mediated talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 425-433, February.
    15. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
    16. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Berman, Ron & Heller, Yuval, 2020. "Naive Analytics Equilibrium," MPRA Paper 103824, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2021. "Learning frames," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 78-96.
    3. Yasar, Alperen, 2023. "Power struggles and gender discrimination in the workplace," SocArXiv t4g83, Center for Open Science.
    4. Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2020. "Categorization and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    5. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
    6. Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2020. "Categorization and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ianni, Antonella, 2001. "Learning correlated equilibria in population games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 271-294, November.
    2. Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2022. "The value of a coordination game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    3. Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2021. "Learning frames," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 78-96.
    4. Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2020. "Categorization and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    5. Mohlin, Erik, 2014. "Optimal categorization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 356-381.
    6. Michele Crescenzi, 2022. "Coordination through ambiguous language," Papers 2211.03426, arXiv.org.
    7. Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2016. "Rule Rationality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 997-1026, August.
    8. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society.
    9. Daskalova, Vessela & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2020. "Categorization and coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    10. Hofbauer, Josef & Sorger, Gerhard, 1999. "Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 1-23, March.
    11. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "Learning, Matching, and Aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-110, January.
    12. Lenzo, Justin & Sarver, Todd, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 271-284, August.
    13. Ellison, Glenn, 1997. "Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 180-210, May.
    14. Cédric Wanko, 2008. "Approche Conceptuelle et Algorithmique des Equilibres de Nash Robustes Incitatifs," Working Papers 08-03, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008.
    15. Demichelis, Stefano & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2003. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 51-75, November.
    16. Kandori, Michihiro & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2008. "Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 328-338, May.
    17. Rossella Argenziano & Itzhak Gilboa, 2012. "History as a coordination device," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 501-512, October.
    18. Charness, Gary & Jackson, Matthew O., 2007. "Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 417-445, September.
    19. Anirban Kar & Indrajit Ray & Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions," Working Papers 2005-10, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    20. Sendhil Mullainathan & Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, 2008. "Coarse Thinking and Persuasion," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 577-619.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Random-matching game; Categorization; Correlated equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:5475. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.