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Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)

  • Avner Shaked

    (Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-26, D-53113 Bonn, GERMANY)

  • Larry Samuelson

    (Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, USA)

  • George J. Mailath

    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA)

This paper shows that Nash equilibria of a local-interaction game are equivalent to correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 551-556

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:551-556
Note: Received: October 3, 1995; revised version February 21, 1996
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Aderlini, L. & Ianni, A., 1993. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbours," Papers 186, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
  2. L. Blume, 2010. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 488, David K. Levine.
  3. repec:att:wimass:9426 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994.
  5. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  6. George Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, 1994. "Evolution and Endogenous Interactions," Game Theory and Information 9410003, EconWPA.
  7. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
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