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Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction, and Random Matching

  • Stephen Morris

Incomplete information, local interaction, and random matching games all share a common structure. A type or player interacts with various subsets of the set of all types/players. A type/player's total payoff is additive in the payoffs from these various interactions. This paper describes a general class of interaction games and shows how each of these three classes of games can be understood as special cases. Techniques and results from the incomplete information literature are translated into this more general framework; as a by-product, it is possible to give a complete characterization of equilibria robust to incomplete information (in the sense of Kajii and Morris [1995]) in many player binary action coordination games. Only equilibria that are robust in this sense [1] can spread contagiously and [2] are uninvadable under best response dynamics in a local interaction system. A companion paper, Morris [1997], uses these techniques to characterize features of local interaction systems that allow contagion.

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Paper provided by Santa Fe Institute in its series Research in Economics with number 97-08-072e.

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Date of creation: Aug 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wop:safire:97-08-072e
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501
Web page: http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/working-papers.html

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  1. Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997. "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 551-556.
  2. S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin, 2010. "p-dominance and Belief Potential," Levine's Working Paper Archive 505, David K. Levine.
  3. Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  4. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "The coexistence of conventions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 241-256, October.
  5. Stephen Morris, . "Co-operation and Timing," Penn CARESS Working Papers b8d506ba7aa15345b602bb4eb, Penn Economics Department.
  6. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
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