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How to shake the invisible hand (when Robinson meets Friday)

Author

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  • Antoine Billot

    (UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas, LEMMA - Laboratoire d'économie mathématique et de microéconomie appliquée - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We propose defining the invisible hand by: (i) modelling the mechanism itself (rather than just assuming its existence); and (ii) making explicit the limit conditions of its working. For that purpose, we simply assimilate the working of the invisible hand mechanism with the existence of a social preference such that individual and social optimalities are consistent. In introducing the possibility of interaction among individuals, we then suggest that the standard "singleton case," or "atomistic individualism," is just an extreme feature of a more general requirement that we call the network agreement. Our main result is that the invisible hand mechanism does keep on working when there is an interaction between Robinson and Friday if the former (respectively, the latter) is sensitive to the latter (respectively, the former) in such a way that they exhibit some agreement in preferences. Hence, the singleton case naturally satisfies this property because neither Robinson nor Friday can disagree with himself. Further cooperative situations are also allowed in order to extent the invisible hand mechanism to cases with interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Billot, 2009. "How to shake the invisible hand (when Robinson meets Friday)," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812836, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00812836
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00108.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Anjan Mukherji, 2012. "The second fundamental theorem of positive economics," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 125-138, June.
    2. Antoine Billot, 2011. "Are Choice Rationality and Social Consistency Two Sides of a Same Coin?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 239-254, March.

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