# Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

# Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld

Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907

Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/

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Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907

Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/

More information through EDIRC

**For corrections or technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Bettina Weingarten)**

**Series handle:**repec:bie:wpaper

**ISSN:**0931-6558

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### 2017

**571 Uncertain acts in games***by*Riedel, Frank**570 Information transmission in hierarchies***by*Schopohl, Simon**443 Existence of financial equilibria in continuous time with potentially complete markets***by*Riedel, Frank & Herzberg, Frederik**442 Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value***by*Casajus, André**441 Financial markets with volatility uncertainty***by*Vorbrink, Jörg**440 Intertemporal equilibria with Knightian uncertainty***by*Dana, Rose-Anne & Riedel, Frank**427 Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules***by*Herzberg, Frederik & Eckert, Daniel**344 Perfection and stability of stationary points with applications to noncooperative games***by*van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf & Yang, Zaifu**343 A general existence theorem of zero points***by*Herings, P. Jean-Jacques**342 Perfectly fair allocations with indivisibilities***by*Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu**341 The max convolution approach to equilibrium analysis***by*Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu**329 NTU prenucleoli***by*Klauke, Sven**327 Antagonistic properties and n-person games***by*Beaud, Jean-Pierre**326 The positive core of a cooperative game***by*Orshan, Gooni & Sudhölter, Peter**325 Reconfirming the prenucleolus***by*Orshan, Gooni & Sudhölter, Peter**324 The dummy paradox of the bargaining set***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter**323 A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games***by*Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel**322 Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory***by*Trockel, Walter**321 Game theory***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Trockel, Walter**320 Cartels via the modiclus***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**319 Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**318 The endogenous formation of cartels***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**317 Experimental evidence for attractions to chance***by*Albers, Wulf**316 The minimal quota for a complete and transitive majority relation***by*Vidu, Laurent**315 Full information, hidden action and hidden information in principal agent games***by*Vogt, Bodo**314 Symmetric homogeneous local interaction***by*Ostmann, Axel & Saboyá, Martha**313 The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game***by*Sudhölter, Peter & Potters, Jos**312 Do monopolies justifiably fear environmental tax reforms***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**311 Bidding for envy freeness***by*Haake, Claus-Jochen & Raith, Matthias G. & Su, Francis Edward**310 A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution***by*Trockel, Walter**309 Strategic environmental trade policy under free entry of firms***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**308 Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions***by*Trockel, Walter**307 Some classes of potential and semi-potential games***by*Kukushkin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**306 On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution***by*Trockel, Walter**305 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory***by*Trockel, Walter**304 Should high tax countries pursue revenue neutral ecological tax reform***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Raith, Matthias**303 Mechanisms in the core of a fee game***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**302 A characterization of vNM stable sets for linear production games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Shitovitz, Benyamin**301 Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies***by*Haake, Claus-Jochen**300 Fair negotiation procedures***by*Raith, Matthias G.**299 Supporting cooperative multi-issue negotiations***by*Raith, Matthias**298 ARTUS: the Adaptable Round Table with a User Specific Surface***by*Raith, Matthias G. & Wilker, Helge**297 An axiomatization of the core***by*Hwang, Yan-An & Sudhölter, Peter**296 Symmetries of games with public and private objectives***by*Kukushkin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**295 Adjusted winner***by*Raith, Matthias & Welzel, Andreas**294 Systems of decreasing reactions and their fixed points***by*Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**293 Large totally balanced games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**292 The positive prekernel of a cooperative game***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter**291 Rationalizability of the Nash bargaining solution***by*Trockel, Walter**290 Single peakedness and coalition proofness***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter**288 The complexity of a number as a quantitative predictor of the frequency of responses under decimal perception***by*Albers, Wulf**287 A model of the concession behavior in the sequence of offers of the German electronic stock exchange trading market (IBIS) based on the prominence structure of the bid ask spread***by*Albers, Wulf & Uphaus, Andreas & Vogt, Bodo**286 The boundedly rational decision process creating probability responses empirical results confirming the theory of prominence***by*Albers, Wulf & Güntzel, Andreas**285 Cash equivalent versus market value***by*Albers, Wulf**284 Evaluation of lotteries with two alternatives by the theory of prominence***by*Albers, Wulf**283 Connection between ultimatum behavior and reciprocity in a combined ultimatum reciprocity game***by*Vogt, Bodo**282 The price response function and logarithmic perception of prices and quantities***by*Fegel, Fred & Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**281 Criteria for fair divisions in ultimatum games***by*Vogt, Bodo**280 Stock price clustering and numerical perception***by*Uphaus, Andreas & Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**279 The strength of reciprocity in a reciprocity game***by*Vogt, Bodo**278 Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with claims***by*Gerber, Anke**277 The averaging mechanism***by*Naeve-Steinweg, Elisabeth**276 The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable***by*Naeve, Jörg**275 On the value of discounted stochastic games***by*Coulomb, Jean-Michel**274 Environmental taxation and the double dividend***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Raith, Matthias G.**273 An extension of the Raiffa Kalai Smorodinsky solution to bargaining problems with claims***by*Gerber, Anke**272 Selection between pareto-optimal outcomes in 2-person bargaining***by*Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**268 The selection of mixed strategies in 2 x 2 bimatrix games***by*Albers, Wulf & Vogt, Bodo**267 Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix games with preplay communication***by*Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**264 Coalition formation in general NTU games***by*Gerber, Anke**263 Characterizations of two extended Walras solutions for open economies***by*Korthues, Bernd**262 Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions***by*Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel**26,1 Decomposition for a static stochastic hierarchical system***by*Gottinger, Hans Werner**261 An improvement on the existence proof of joint plan equilibria***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**259 The welfare implications of an ecological tax reform under monopoly***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**258 A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies***by*Peleg, Bezalel**256 Consistency and its convers: an approach for economies***by*Korthues, Bernd**255 The existence of Nash equilibria in two-person, infinitely repeated undiscounted games of incomplete information***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**254 Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies***by*Peleg, Bezalel**251 A further extension of the KKMS theorem***by*Kannai, Yakar & Wooders, Myrna H.**250 Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems***by*Sudhölter, Peter**249 Two games of interjurisdictional competition where local governments provide industrial public goods***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**248 Separable aggregation and the existence of Nash equilibrium***by*Kukushkin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**247 A formal approach to Nash's program***by*Peleg, Bezalel**246 Airport problems and consistent solution rules***by*Potters, Jos & Sudhölter, Peter**245 An exact implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in dominant strategies***by*Trockel, Walter**244 The Nash solution as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on bargaining games***by*Gerber, Anke**243 Pigouvian taxes may fail even in a perfect world***by*Requate, Till**242 Alienated extensions and common knowledge worlds***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**241 Existence of generalized Walras equilibria for generalized economies***by*Korthues, Bernd**240 The Shapley value for countably many players***by*Pallaschke, Diethard & Rosenmüller, Joachim**239 Interjurisdictional competition in emission taxes under imperfect competition of local firms***by*Upmann, Thorsten**238 Interjurisdictional tax competition, provision of two local public goods, and environmental policy***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**237 Conservation of energy in nonatomic games***by*Ortmann, Michael**236 Preservation of differences, potential, conservity***by*Ortmann, Michael**223 Population and environmental quality***by*Cronshaw, Mark B. & Requate, Till**222 Incentives to innovate under emission taxes and tradeable permits***by*Requate, Till**220 Independence for characterizing axioms of the pre-nucleolus***by*Sudhölter, Peter**219 Equivalence of effluent taxes and permits for environmental regulation of several local monopolies***by*Requate, Till**218 A mathematical note on the structure of SYMLOG directions***by*Betten, Dieter & Ostmann, Axel**217 Incentives in market games with asymmetric information***by*Allen, Beth**216 Pollution control under imperfect competition***by*Requate, Till**214 Zur Prominenzstruktur von Zahlenangaben bei diffuser numerischer Information***by*Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**213 Star shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games and application to weighted majority games***by*Sudhölter, Peter**212 Pollution control under imperfect competition via taxes or permits***by*Requate, Till**211 Incentives in market games with asymmetric information***by*Allen, Beth**210 Permits or taxes***by*Requate, Till**209 The kernel of homogeneous games with steps***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**208 Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes***by*Schmeidler, David & Tauman, Yair**207 Linear representability without completeness and transitivity***by*Trockel, Walter**206 Central bank policy under strategic wage setting***by*Bieta, Volker**205 Robust implementation under alternative information structures***by*Corchón, Luis C. & Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio**204 Nash equilibria of informational extensions***by*Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**203 On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives***by*Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**202 The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**201 Informationsverarbeitungsstrukturen in begrenzt rationalen komplexen individuellen Entscheidungen***by*Brunwinkel, Andrea**200 On the value of having the decision on the outcome of others***by*Albers, Wulf & Zamir, Shmuel**199 Implementing demand equilibria as stable states of a revealed demand approach***by*Albers, Wulf & Laing, James D.**198 Wage formation and credibility***by*Bieta, Volker & Straub, Martin**197 An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem***by*Trockel, Walter**195 Directed and weighted majority games***by*Krohn, Ingomar & Sudhölter, Peter**194 Dynamic Bertrand Edgeworth competition with entry, exit decisions***by*Requate, Till**193 The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel**192 Repeated Bertrand Edgeworth competition with increasing marginal costs***by*Requate, Till**191 Eine spieltheoretische Variante des Maximum-Prinzips***by*Vorobʹev, Nikolaj N.**190 Fee games: (N)TU-games with incomplete information***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**188 Sources of prominence in computer aided experimental spatial games***by*Albers, Wulf & Laing, James D.**187 A bargaining problem with transferable utility***by*Weidner, Frank**185 Domination, core and solution***by*Bondareva, Olga**183 Revealed fuzzy preferences***by*Bondareva, Olga**182 On optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with lack of information on one side***by*Heuer, Martin**181 Präferenzoffenbarung wirtschaftspolitischer Entscheidungsträger als Element der ¬Pollitikgestaltung [Politikgestaltung] im Kontext der asymmetrischen Information***by*Bieta, Volker**180 On the Harsanyi-Selten value***by*Weidner, Frank**179 Implementing the modified LH-algorithm***by*Krohn, Ingomar**177 A multi-person approach towards the maximization of the average rate of return***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**176 The nucleolus of a game without side payments***by*Bondareva, Olga**175 Nash implementation with renegotiation in the case of two agents***by*Homann, Detlev**174 Asymptotically optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information***by*Heuer, Martin**172 Homogeneous games as anti step functions***by*Sudhölter, Peter**170 Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents***by*Homann, Detlev**169 Simple games***by*Ostmann, Axel**167 A contribution to the macro theory of comparative economic systems***by*Ichiishi, Tatsuro**166 Remarks on cooperative games with incomplete information***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**165 Comparative cooperative game theory***by*Ichiishi, Tatsuro**164 Theorems on closed coverings of a simplex and their applications to cooperative game theory***by*Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam**163 A discrete approach to general equilibrium and NTU-games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**162 Uniqueness of individual demand at almost every budget via Sard's theorem***by*Trockel, Walter**161 Games and incomplete information***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**160 Discounted two person zero sum games with lack of information on both sides***by*Heuer, Martin**158 Beiträge zum begrenzt rationalen Verhalten***by*Albers, Wulf**157 An invariance theorem for preferences and some applications***by*Trockel, Walter**156 Life-length of process with elements of decreasing importance***by*Ostmann, Axel**155 Equilibria in markets with incomplete information on qualities***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**154 An information-theoretic approach to infinitely repeated games with lack of information on both sides***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**153 The rôle of nondegeneracy and homogeneity in n-person game theory***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**150 Classification of price-invariant preferences***by*Trockel, Walter**148 An algorithm for the construction of homogeneous games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**147 Statistically varying K-person games with incomplete information***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**145 Two-person bargaining between threat and fair solution***by*Albers, Wulf**144 Construction of homogeneous zero-sum games***by*Sudhölter, Peter**143 Homogeneous games with countably many players***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**142 Discrimination of equally sized subsets for discrete, memoryless channels***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**141 Für Abhängige keinen Zugewinn***by*Ostmann, Axel**140 Classifying three person games***by*Ostmann, Axel**139 Empirische Analyse der Minimaldarstellung von Parlamenten***by*Bieta, Volker**138 Homogeneous games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**137 The structure of homogeneous games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**134 Statistically varying games with incomplete information***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**133 Geordnete einfache Spiele***by*Ostmann, Axel**131 The biological counterpart to non-cooperative game theory***by*Hammerstein, Peter**130 Institutional utilitarianism***by*Selten, Reinhard**129 Are cartel laws bad for business***by*Selten, Reinhard**128 Weighted majority games and the matrix of homogeneity***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**127 Wahlen, Repraesentation und der Mechanismus des Proporzes***by*Ostmann, Axel**126 Kernel and core of replicated market games***by*Klein, Ulrich**125 On the prominence structure of the decimal system***by*Albers, Wulf & Albers, Gisela**124 On the minimal representation of homogeneous games***by*Ostmann, Axel**123 End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner's dilemma supergames***by*Selten, Reinhard & Stoecker, Rolf**120 Game theory in the ecological context***by*Riechert, Susan E. & Hammerstein, Peter**119 Equal division payoff bounds for 3-person characteristic function experiments***by*Selten, Reinhard**118 Comparison of two theories for characteristic function experiments***by*Selten, Reinhard & Krischker, Wilhelm**117 Elementary theory of slack ridden imperfect competition***by*Selten, Reinhard**116 Ein Zugang zu Differentialspielen***by*Ostmann, Axel**115 On homogeneous weights for simple games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**113 Original oder Fälschung***by*Selten, Reinhard & Güth, Werner**112 Cu mi lernu esperanton***by*Selten, Reinhard & Pool, Jonathan**111 Equal division kernel and referenc coalitions in three-person games***by*Crott, Helmut W. & Scholz, Roland W. & Albers, Wulf**108 From ability to pay to concepts of equal sacrifice***by*Richter, Wolfram F.**106 A normative justification of progressive taxation***by*Richter, Wolfram F.**104 Das erlernte Schlußverhalten, eine experimentelle Untersuchung***by*Stoecker, Rolf**103 LP games with sufficiently many players***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**102 On income tax functions***by*Richter, Wolfram F. & Hampe, J. Felix**101 The partially pegging exchange rate problem***by*Chen, John-ren**100 The effects of the partially pegging exchange rate policy in a small economy***by*Chen, John-ren**99 Der Kern fuer n-Personen-Einfache-Produktionsspiele***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**98 The equal division kernel***by*Crott, Helmut W. & Albers, Wulf**97 Eine ökonometrische Untersuchung über die Auswirkungen der Importhemmnisse der Industrieländer für die Industrieerzeugnisse der Dritten Welt auf die ökonomische Entwicklung der Entwicklungsländer***by*Chen, John-ren**96 Equilibrium point selection in a bargaining situation with opportunity costs***by*Selten, Reinhard & Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike**95 A note on "An impossibility result concerning n-person bargaining games***by*Huttel, Götz & Richter, Wolfram F.**94 Taxation according to ability to pay***by*Richter, Wolfram F.