# Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

# Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers

Postal: Postfach 10 01 31, 33501 Bielefeld

Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907

Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/

More information through EDIRC

Phone: +49(0)521-106-4907

Web page: http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/

More information through EDIRC

**For corrections or technical questions regarding this series, please contact (Bettina Weingarten)**

**Series handle:**repec:bie:wpaper

**ISSN:**0931-6558

**Citations RSS feed:**at CitEc

### Impact factors

- Simple (last 10 years)
- Recursive (10)
- Discounted (10)
- Recursive discounted (10)
- H-Index (10)
- Euclid (10)
- Aggregate (10)

**Access and download statistics**

**Top item:**

- By citations
- By downloads (last 12 months)

### 2017

**576 The impartial observer under uncertainty***by*Berens, Stefan & Chochua, Lasha**575 Viability and arbitrage under Knightian Uncertainty***by*Burzoni, M. & Riedel, Frank & Soner, H.M.**574 Asymmetric dominance effect with multiple decoys for low- and high-variance lotteries***by*Sürücü, Oktay & Brangewitz, Sonja & Mir Djawadi, Behnud**573 Dynamically consistent preferences under imprecise probabilistic information***by*Riedel, Frank & Tallon, Jean-Marc & Vergopoulos, Vassili**572 A Note on "Renegotiation in Repeated Games" [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]***by*Günther, Michael**571 Uncertain acts in games***by*Riedel, Frank**570 Information transmission in hierarchies***by*Schopohl, Simon**529 Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks***by*Gauer, Florian & Hellmann, Tim**443 Existence of financial equilibria in continuous time with potentially complete markets***by*Riedel, Frank & Herzberg, Frederik**442 Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value***by*Casajus, André**441 Financial markets with volatility uncertainty***by*Vorbrink, Jörg**440 Intertemporal equilibria with Knightian uncertainty***by*Dana, Rose-Anne & Riedel, Frank**427 Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules***by*Herzberg, Frederik & Eckert, Daniel**353 On the connectedness of coincidences and zero poins of mappings***by*Talman, Dolf & Yang, Zaifu**350 Trading bargaining weights***by*Ervig, Ulrike & Haake, Claus-Jochen**344 Perfection and stability of stationary points with applications to noncooperative games***by*van der Laan, Gerard & Talman, Dolf & Yang, Zaifu**343 A general existence theorem of zero points***by*Herings, P. Jean-Jacques**342 Perfectly fair allocations with indivisibilities***by*Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu**341 The max convolution approach to equilibrium analysis***by*Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu**330 Moral property rights in bargaining***by*Gächter, Simon & Riedl, Arno**329 NTU prenucleoli***by*Klauke, Sven**328 The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defence***by*Fleurbaey, Marc**327 Antagonistic properties and n-person games***by*Beaud, Jean-Pierre**326 The positive core of a cooperative game***by*Orshan, Gooni & Sudhölter, Peter**325 Reconfirming the prenucleolus***by*Orshan, Gooni & Sudhölter, Peter**324 The dummy paradox of the bargaining set***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter**323 A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games***by*Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel**322 Can and should the Nash Program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory***by*Trockel, Walter**321 Game theory***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Trockel, Walter**320 Cartels via the modiclus***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**319 Formation of cartels in glove markets and the modiclus***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**318 The endogenous formation of cartels***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**317 Experimental evidence for attractions to chance***by*Albers, Wulf**316 The minimal quota for a complete and transitive majority relation***by*Vidu, Laurent**315 Full information, hidden action and hidden information in principal agent games***by*Vogt, Bodo**314 Symmetric homogeneous local interaction***by*Ostmann, Axel & Saboyá, Martha**313 The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game***by*Sudhölter, Peter & Potters, Jos**312 Do monopolies justifiably fear environmental tax reforms***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**311 Bidding for envy freeness***by*Haake, Claus-Jochen & Raith, Matthias G. & Su, Francis Edward**310 A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution***by*Trockel, Walter**309 Strategic environmental trade policy under free entry of firms***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**308 Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions***by*Trockel, Walter**307 Some classes of potential and semi-potential games***by*Kukushkin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**306 On the Nash program for the Nash bargaining solution***by*Trockel, Walter**305 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory***by*Trockel, Walter**304 Should high tax countries pursue revenue neutral ecological tax reform***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Raith, Matthias**303 Mechanisms in the core of a fee game***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**302 A characterization of vNM stable sets for linear production games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Shitovitz, Benyamin**301 Implementation of the Kalai Smorodinski bargaining solution in dominant strategies***by*Haake, Claus-Jochen**300 Fair negotiation procedures***by*Raith, Matthias G.**299 Supporting cooperative multi-issue negotiations***by*Raith, Matthias**298 ARTUS: the Adaptable Round Table with a User Specific Surface***by*Raith, Matthias G. & Wilker, Helge**297 An axiomatization of the core***by*Hwang, Yan-An & Sudhölter, Peter**296 Symmetries of games with public and private objectives***by*Kukushkin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**295 Adjusted winner***by*Raith, Matthias & Welzel, Andreas**294 Systems of decreasing reactions and their fixed points***by*Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**293 Large totally balanced games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**292 The positive prekernel of a cooperative game***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter**291 Rationalizability of the Nash bargaining solution***by*Trockel, Walter**290 Single peakedness and coalition proofness***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter**288 The complexity of a number as a quantitative predictor of the frequency of responses under decimal perception***by*Albers, Wulf**287 A model of the concession behavior in the sequence of offers of the German electronic stock exchange trading market (IBIS) based on the prominence structure of the bid ask spread***by*Albers, Wulf & Uphaus, Andreas & Vogt, Bodo**286 The boundedly rational decision process creating probability responses empirical results confirming the theory of prominence***by*Albers, Wulf & Güntzel, Andreas**285 Cash equivalent versus market value***by*Albers, Wulf**284 Evaluation of lotteries with two alternatives by the theory of prominence***by*Albers, Wulf**283 Connection between ultimatum behavior and reciprocity in a combined ultimatum reciprocity game***by*Vogt, Bodo**282 The price response function and logarithmic perception of prices and quantities***by*Fegel, Fred & Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**281 Criteria for fair divisions in ultimatum games***by*Vogt, Bodo**280 Stock price clustering and numerical perception***by*Uphaus, Andreas & Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**279 The strength of reciprocity in a reciprocity game***by*Vogt, Bodo**278 Reference functions and solutions to bargaining problems with claims***by*Gerber, Anke**277 The averaging mechanism***by*Naeve-Steinweg, Elisabeth**276 The Nash bargaining solution is Nash implementable***by*Naeve, Jörg**275 On the value of discounted stochastic games***by*Coulomb, Jean-Michel**274 Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a drawback for a revenue-neutral tax reform***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Raith, Matthias G.**273 An extension of the Raiffa Kalai Smorodinsky solution to bargaining problems with claims***by*Gerber, Anke**272 Selection between pareto-optimal outcomes in 2-person bargaining***by*Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**271 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part V: Operations on scales, and evaluation of prospects***by*Albers, Wulf**270 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part IV: Task dependence of smallest received money units, nonexistence of general utility functions, and related paradoxa***by*Albers, Wulf**268 The selection of mixed strategies in 2 x 2 bimatrix games***by*Albers, Wulf & Vogt, Bodo**267 Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix games with preplay communication***by*Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**266 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part II: Exactness selection rule, and confirming results***by*Albers, Wulf & Albers, Eike & Albers, Leif & Vogt, Bodo**265 Foundations of a theory of prominence in the decimal system. Part I: Numerical response as a process, exactness, scales, and structure of scales***by*Albers, Wulf**264 Coalition formation in general NTU games***by*Gerber, Anke**263 Characterizations of two extended Walras solutions for open economies***by*Korthues, Bernd**262 Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions***by*Sudhölter, Peter & Peleg, Bezalel**26,1 Decomposition for a static stochastic hierarchical system***by*Gottinger, Hans Werner**261 An improvement on the existence proof of joint plan equilibria***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**260 The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part II***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**259 The welfare implications of an ecological tax reform under monopoly***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**258 A note on existence of equilibria in generalized economies***by*Peleg, Bezalel**257 The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part II - Representation***by*Sudhölter, Peter & Rosenmüller, Joachim**256 Consistency and its convers: an approach for economies***by*Korthues, Bernd**255 The existence of Nash equilibria in two-person, infinitely repeated undiscounted games of incomplete information***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**254 Partial equilibrium in pure exchange economies***by*Peleg, Bezalel**253 The canonical extensive form of a game form. Part I - Symmetries***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**252 The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets: Part I***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**251 A further extension of the KKMS theorem***by*Kannai, Yakar & Wooders, Myrna H.**250 Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems***by*Sudhölter, Peter**249 Two games of interjurisdictional competition where local governments provide industrial public goods***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**248 Separable aggregation and the existence of Nash equilibrium***by*Kukushkin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**247 A formal approach to Nash's program***by*Peleg, Bezalel**246 Airport problems and consistent solution rules***by*Potters, Jos & Sudhölter, Peter**245 An exact implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in dominant strategies***by*Trockel, Walter**244 The Nash solution as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on bargaining games***by*Gerber, Anke**243 Pigouvian taxes may fail even in a perfect world***by*Requate, Till**242 Alienated extensions and common knowledge worlds***by*Simon, Robert Samuel**241 Existence of generalized Walras equilibria for generalized economies***by*Korthues, Bernd**240 The Shapley value for countably many players***by*Pallaschke, Diethard & Rosenmüller, Joachim**239 Interjurisdictional competition in emission taxes under imperfect competition of local firms***by*Upmann, Thorsten**238 Interjurisdictional tax competition, provision of two local public goods, and environmental policy***by*Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten**237 Conservation of energy in nonatomic games***by*Ortmann, Michael**236 Preservation of differences, potential, conservity***by*Ortmann, Michael**235 On the existence of equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies***by*Spanjers, Willy**234 Green taxes in oligopoly revisited: exogenous versus endogenous number of firms***by*Requate, Till**233 Excessive and under-investment: on the incentives to adopt new technologies under Pigouvian taxes and tradeable permits***by*Requate, Till**232 Solution concepts for c-convex, assignment, and m2-games***by*Sudhölter, Peter**231 A Walrasian approach to bargaining games***by*Trockel, Walter**230 An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter**229 Endogenous structures of trade relationships in hierarchically structured economies with bid and ask prices and two commodities***by*Spanjers, Willy**228 Bargaining with incomplete information: an axiomatic approach***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**227 Concave utility and individual demand***by*Kannai, Yakar**226 Arbitrage and monopolistic market structures***by*Spanjers, Willy**225 Bid and ask prices in hierarchically structured economies with two commodities***by*Spanjers, Willy**224 Arbitrage and Walrasian equilibrium in hierarchically structured economies***by*Spanjers, Willy**223 Population and environmental quality***by*Cronshaw, Mark B. & Requate, Till**222 Incentives to innovate under emission taxes and tradeable permits***by*Requate, Till**221 Entwurf zur Verbesserung der Lenkungseffizienz der Selbstbeteiligung in der GKV am Beispiel Zahnersatz. Der Proportionaltarif mit differenziertem Selbstbehalt***by*Winkler, Walter**220 Independence for characterizing axioms of the pre-nucleolus***by*Sudhölter, Peter**219 Equivalence of effluent taxes and permits for environmental regulation of several local monopolies***by*Requate, Till**218 A mathematical note on the structure of SYMLOG directions***by*Betten, Dieter & Ostmann, Axel**217 Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: approximate (NTU) cores in large economies***by*Allen, Beth**216 Pollution control under imperfect competition: asymmetric Bertrand oligopoly with linear technologies***by*Requate, Till**215 Representation of CII-Games and the expected contract value***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**214 Zur Prominenzstruktur von Zahlenangaben bei diffuser numerischer Information***by*Vogt, Bodo & Albers, Wulf**213 Star shapedness of the kernel for homogeneous games and application to weighted majority games***by*Sudhölter, Peter**212 Pollution control under imperfect competition via taxes or permits: Cournot Duopoly***by*Requate, Till**211 Incentives in market games with asymmetric information***by*Allen, Beth**210 Permits or taxes? How to regulate Cournot Duopoly with polluting firms***by*Requate, Till**209 The kernel of homogeneous games with steps***by*Peleg, Bezalel & Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**208 Incentive compatible cost allocation schemes***by*Schmeidler, David & Tauman, Yair**207 Linear representability without completeness and transitivity***by*Trockel, Walter**206 Central bank policy under strategic wage setting***by*Bieta, Volker**205 Robust implementation under alternative information structures***by*Corchón, Luis C. & Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio**204 Nash equilibria of informational extensions***by*Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**203 On existence of stable and efficient outcomes in games with public and private objectives***by*Kukuškin, Nikolaj Serafimovič**202 The nucleolus of homogeneous games with steps***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Sudhölter, Peter**201 Informationsverarbeitungsstrukturen in begrenzt rationalen komplexen individuellen Entscheidungen***by*Brunwinkel, Andrea**200 On the value of having the decision on the outcome of others***by*Albers, Wulf & Zamir, Shmuel**199 Implementing demand equilibria as stable states of a revealed demand approach***by*Albers, Wulf & Laing, James D.**198 Wage formation and credibility***by*Bieta, Volker & Straub, Martin**197 An alternative proof for the linear utility representation theorem***by*Trockel, Walter**195 Directed and weighted majority games***by*Krohn, Ingomar & Sudhölter, Peter**194 Dynamic Bertrand Edgeworth competition with entry, exit decisions***by*Requate, Till**193 The least core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim & Peleg, Bezalel**192 Repeated Bertrand Edgeworth competition with increasing marginal costs***by*Requate, Till**191 Eine spieltheoretische Variante des Maximum-Prinzips***by*Vorobʹev, Nikolaj N.**190 Fee games: (N)TU-games with incomplete information***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**188 Sources of prominence in computer aided experimental spatial games***by*Albers, Wulf & Laing, James D.**187 A bargaining problem with transferable utility***by*Weidner, Frank**185 Domination, core and solution***by*Bondareva, Olga**183 Revealed fuzzy preferences***by*Bondareva, Olga**182 On optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with lack of information on one side***by*Heuer, Martin**181 Präferenzoffenbarung wirtschaftspolitischer Entscheidungsträger als Element der ¬Pollitikgestaltung [Politikgestaltung] im Kontext der asymmetrischen Information***by*Bieta, Volker**180 On the Harsanyi-Selten value***by*Weidner, Frank**179 Implementing the modified LH-algorithm***by*Krohn, Ingomar**178 Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der "incentive" Struktur einer Politikinstanz, eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch "pooling equilibria" oder "separating equilibria"***by*Bieta, Volker**177 A multi-person approach towards the maximization of the average rate of return***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**176 The nucleolus of a game without side payments***by*Bondareva, Olga**175 Nash implementation with renegotiation in the case of two agents***by*Homann, Detlev**174 Asymptotically optimal strategies in repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information***by*Heuermann, Martina**173 Über Informationsprobleme bei der Implementation von Mechanismen***by*Trockel, Walter**172 Homogeneous games as anti step functions***by*Sudhölter, Peter**170 Incomplete contracts and Nash implementation in the case of two agents***by*Homann, Detlev**169 Simple games: on order and symmetry***by*Ostmann, Axel**167 A contribution to the macro theory of comparative economic systems***by*Ichiishi, Tatsuro**166 Remarks on cooperative games with incomplete information***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**165 Comparative cooperative game theory***by*Ichiishi, Tatsuro**164 Theorems on closed coverings of a simplex and their applications to cooperative game theory***by*Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam**163 A discrete approach to general equilibrium and NTU-games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**162 Uniqueness of individual demand at almost every budget via Sard's theorem***by*Trockel, Walter**161 Games and incomplete information***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**160 Discounted two person zero sum games with lack of information on both sides***by*Heuer, Martin**159 Aspirations and aspiration adjustment in location games***by*Albers, Wulf**158 Beiträge zum begrenzt rationalen Verhalten***by*Albers, Wulf**157 An invariance theorem for preferences and some applications***by*Trockel, Walter**156 Life-length of process with elements of decreasing importance***by*Ostmann, Axel**155 Equilibria in markets with incomplete information on qualities***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**154 An information-theoretic approach to infinitely repeated games with lack of information on both sides***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**153 The rôle of nondegeneracy and homogeneity in n-person game theory***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**152 Ergebnisse experimenteller Standortspiele II***by*Albers, Wulf**151 Ergebnisse experimenteller Standortspiele I***by*Albers, Wulf**150 Classification of price-invariant preferences***by*Trockel, Walter**149 Games and incomplete information. A survey: Part II***by*Heuer, Martin**148 An algorithm for the construction of homogeneous games***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim**147 Statistically varying K-person games with incomplete information***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**146 Games and incomplete information. A survey: Part I***by*Wallmeier, Hans-Martin**145 Two-person bargaining between threat and fair solution***by*Albers, Wulf**144 Construction of homogeneous zero-sum games***by*Sudhölter, Peter**143 Homogeneous games with countably many players***by*Rosenmüller, Joachim