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A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion

Author

Listed:
  • Pahlke, Marieke

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

Beauchêne, Li, and Li (2019) show that ambiguous persuasion leads to new interim equilibria with higher ex ante value for the Sender compared to the standard Bayesian persuasion. However, in their equilibrium the strategy of the Receiver is in general not ex ante optimal. This note, de fines rectangular beliefs over the full state space in the same setting as Beauchêne et al. (2019) and shows that given rectangular be- liefs the Receiver behaves dynamically consistent. Hence, the interim equilibrium of Beauchêne et al. (2019) is an ante equilibrium, as well.

Suggested Citation

  • Pahlke, Marieke, 2019. "A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 611, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:611
    as

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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2934489/2934490
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. Beauchêne, Dorian & Li, Jian & Li, Ming, 2019. "Ambiguous persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 312-365.
    3. Pahlke, Marieke, 2018. "Dynamic Consistency in Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Priors," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 599, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    4. Kellner, Christian & Le Quement, Mark T., 2018. "Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 1-17.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Denis Shishkin & Pietro Ortoleva, 2021. "Ambiguous Information and Dilation: An Experiment," Working Papers 2020-53, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    2. Xiaoyu Cheng, 2020. "Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation," Papers 2010.05376, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian Persuasion; Ambiguity Aversion; Dynamic Consistency;
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