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Optimal Surplus-dependent Reinsurance under Regime-Switching in a Brownian Risk Model

Author

Listed:
  • Eisenberg, Julia

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Fabrykowski, Lukas

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Schmeck, Maren Diane

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a company that wishes to determine the optimal reinsurance strategy minimising the total expected discounted amount of capital injections needed to prevent the ruin. The company's surplus process is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift, and the reinsurance price is modelled by a continuous-time Markov chain with two states. The presence of regime-switching complicates substantially the optimal reinsurance problem, as the surplus-independent strategies turn out to be suboptimal. We develop a recursive approach that allows to represent a solution to the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the corresponding reinsurance strategy as the unique limits of the sequence of solutions to ordinary differential equations and their first and second order derivatives. Via Ito's formula we prove the constructed function to be the value function. Two examples illustrate the recursive procedure along with a numerical approach yielding the direct solution to the HJB equation.

Suggested Citation

  • Eisenberg, Julia & Fabrykowski, Lukas & Schmeck, Maren Diane, 2021. "Optimal Surplus-dependent Reinsurance under Regime-Switching in a Brownian Risk Model," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 648, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:648
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2953603/2953606
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Matteo Brachetta & Claudia Ceci, 2019. "A BSDE-based approach for the optimal reinsurance problem under partial information," Papers 1910.05999, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
    2. Zied Ben Salah & Jos'e Garrido, 2017. "On Fair Reinsurance Premiums; Capital Injections in a Perturbed Risk Model," Papers 1710.11065, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2018.
    3. Hans Gerber & Elias Shiu, 1998. "On the Time Value of Ruin," North American Actuarial Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 48-72.
    4. Eisenberg, Julia & Krühner, Paul, 2018. "The impact of negative interest rates on optimal capital injections," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-10.
    5. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006. "Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
    6. Pablo Azcue & Nora Muler, 2005. "Optimal Reinsurance And Dividend Distribution Policies In The Cramér‐Lundberg Model," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 261-308, April.
    7. Hojgaard, Bjarne & Taksar, Michael, 1998. "Optimal proportional reinsurance policies for diffusion models with transaction costs," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 41-51, May.
    8. Ben Salah, Zied & Garrido, José, 2018. "On fair reinsurance premiums; Capital injections in a perturbed risk model," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 11-20.
    9. Mathieu Bargès & Stéphane Loisel & Xavier Venel, 2011. "On finite-time ruin probabilities with reinsurance cycles influenced by large claims," Post-Print hal-00430178, HAL.
    10. Zhengjun Jiang & Martijn Pistorius, 2012. "Optimal dividend distribution under Markov regime switching," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 449-476, July.
    11. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006. "Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
    12. Brachetta, M. & Ceci, C., 2020. "A BSDE-based approach for the optimal reinsurance problem under partial information," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 1-16.
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    Cited by:

    1. Abbaspour, Manijeh & Vajargah, Kianoush Fathi & Azhdari, Parvin, 2023. "An efficient algorithm for pricing reinsurance contract under the regime-switching model," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 278-300.
    2. Corina Constantinescu & Julia Eisenberg, 2021. "Special Issue “Interplay between Financial and Actuarial Mathematics”," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(8), pages 1-3, July.
    3. Federico, Salvatore & Ferrari, Giorgio & Torrente, Maria Laura, 2023. "Irreversible Reinsurance: Minimization of Capital Injections in Presence of a Fixed Cost," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 682, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.

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