IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Remedies for Sick Insurance

  • Daniel McFadden
  • Carlos Noton
  • Pau Olivella

health care reform

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 620.

in new window

Date of creation: Sep 2015
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:620
Contact details of provider: Postal: Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27, 08005 Barcelona
Phone: +34 93 542-1222
Fax: +34 93 542-1223
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David M. Cutler & Sarah Reber, 1996. "Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Competition and Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 5796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Douglas Gale, 1996. "Equilibria and Pareto optima of markets with adverse selection (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 207-235.
  3. Bertrand Villeneuve, 2000. "The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(1), pages 65-79, June.
  4. Olivier Mahul & Brian D. Wright, 2004. "Implications of Incomplete Performance for Optimal Insurance," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71(284), pages 661-670, November.
  5. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
  6. Mailath, George J. & Nöldeke, Georg, 2008. "Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 97-125, May.
  7. David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1999. "The Anatomy of Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 7176, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Bradley Herring & Mark V. Pauly, 2006. "The Effect of State Community Rating Regulations on Premiums and Coverage in the Individual Health Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12504, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2008. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 303-350, 04.
  10. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  11. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-80, Part I, M.
  12. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2000. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," NBER Working Papers 8045, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
  14. Philippe, DE DONDER & Jean, HINDRIKS, 2006. "Equilibrium Social Insurance with Policy-Motivated Parties," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006018, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  15. Radner, Roy, 1970. "Problems in the Theory of Markets under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(2), pages 454-60, May.
  16. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 207-219, March.
  17. Finkelstein, Amy & Poterba, James & Rothschild, Casey, 2009. "Redistribution by insurance market regulation: Analyzing a ban on gender-based retirement annuities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 38-58, January.
  18. Heiss, Florian & McFadden, Daniel L. & Winter, Joachim, 2006. "Who failed to enroll in Medicare Part D, and why? Early results," Munich Reprints in Economics 19427, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  19. William Johnson, 1977. "Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 23-35, September.
  20. Jonathan Gruber, 2008. "Covering the Uninsured in the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(3), pages 571-606, September.
  21. Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Minimum Coverage Regulation in Insurance Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 301, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  22. Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, 2011. "Choice Inconsistencies among the Elderly: Evidence from Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1180-1210, June.
  23. Nathaniel Hendren, 2013. "Private Information and Insurance Rejections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(5), pages 1713-1762, 09.
  24. David M. Cutler & Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance," NBER Working Papers 13746, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 2001. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 249-62, Summer.
  26. Hector Chade & Edward Schlee, 2008. "Optimal Insurance with Adverse Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002175, David K. Levine.
  27. Max R. Blouin, 2003. "Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 245-262, 09.
  28. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May.
  29. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
  30. Spence, Michael, 1976. "Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 591-97, November.
  31. Riley, John G, 2002. " Weak and Strong Signals," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(2), pages 213-36, June.
  32. Thomas G. McGuire & Jacob Glazer, 2000. "Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1055-1071, September.
  33. Spence, Michael & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1971. "Insurance, Information, and Individual Action," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 380-87, May.
  34. Hector Chade & Virginia N. Vera de Serio, 2002. "Risk aversion, moral hazard, and the principal's loss," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 637-644.
  35. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  36. Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernandez, 2010. "How complex are the contracts offered by health plans?," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 1(3), pages 305-323, July.
  37. Michael Smart, 1996. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," Working Papers msmart-96-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  38. Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection," Discussion Paper Serie A 82, University of Bonn, Germany.
  39. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February.
  40. Marie-Cécile FAGART & Bidénam KAMBIA-CHOPIN, 2006. "Prevention in insurance markets," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 82, pages 55-70.
  41. Florian Heiss & Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter, 2009. "Regulation of private health insurance markets: Lessons from enrollment, plan type choice, and adverse selection in Medicare Part D," NBER Working Papers 15392, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  42. Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 3412, CESifo Group Munich.
  43. Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter & Florian Heiss, 2008. "Consumer-Directed Health Care: Can Consumers Look After Themselves?," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 144(III), pages 285-307, September.
  44. Finkelstein, Amy, 2004. "Minimum standards, insurance regulation and adverse selection: evidence from the Medigap market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2515-2547, December.
  45. Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-27, Autumn.
  46. Pierre‐André Chiappori & Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2006. "Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 783-798, December.
  47. Spence, Michael, 1974. "Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 296-332, March.
  48. William F. Sharpe, 1964. "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions Of Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 19(3), pages 425-442, 09.
  49. David Card & Carlos Dobkin & Nicole Maestas, 2008. "The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Medicare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2242-58, December.
  50. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié, 1997. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Working Papers 97-11, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  51. Thomas Buchmueller, 2008. "Community Rating, Entry-Age Rating and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance in Australia*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 33(4), pages 588-609, October.
  52. Roger Feldman & Carlos Escribano & Laura Pellisé, 1998. "The role of government in health insurance markets with adverse selection," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(8), pages 659-670.
  53. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N. & Fombaron, N., 2000. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal- 00-05, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  54. Wilson, Charles A, 1979. "Equilibrium and Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 313-17, May.
  55. David Card & Carlos Dobkin & Nicole Maestas, 2004. "The Impact of Nearly Universal Insurance Coverage on Health Care Utilization and Health: Evidence from Medicare," NBER Working Papers 10365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  56. Javier M. LÕpez-Cunat, 2000. "Adverse selection under ignorance," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 379-399.
  57. Peter A. Diamond, 1978. "Welfare Analysis of Imperfect Information Equilibria," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(1), pages 82-105, Spring.
  58. John G. Riley, 1974. "Competitive Signalling," UCLA Economics Working Papers 050, UCLA Department of Economics.
  59. Olivella, Pau & Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, 2007. "Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 233-250, March.
  60. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  61. Jaap H. Abbring & James J. Heckman & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003. "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard In Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 512-521, 04/05.
  62. Max Blouin, 2001. "Equilibrium in a Decentralized Market with Adverse Selection," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 128, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Mar 2001.
  63. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September.
  64. Pau Olivella & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2015. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health Insurance," Working Papers 246, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  65. B. Dahlby, 1981. "Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 547-558, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:620. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruno Guallar)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.