Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables
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- Smart, Michael, 2000. "Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 153-169, February.
References listed on IDEAS
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- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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